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Abstract. Micro-blogging services such as Twitter allow anyone to publish anything, anytime. Needless to say, 
many of the available contents can be diminished as babble or spam. However, given the number and diversity 
of users, some valuable pieces of information should arise from the stream of tweets. Thus, such services can 
develop into valuable sources of up-to-date information (the so-called real-time web) provided a way to find the 
most relevant/trustworthy/authoritative users is available. Hence, this makes a highly pertinent question for 
which graph centrality methods can provide an answer. In this paper the author offers a comprehensive survey of 
feasible algorithms for ranking users in social networks, he examines their vulnerabilities to linking malpractice 
in such networks, and suggests an objective criterion against which to compare such algorithms. Additionally, he 
suggests a first step towards ―desensitizing‖ prestige algorithms against cheating by spammers and other abusive 
users. 
Keywords. Social networks; Twitter; spamming; graph centrality; prestige. 
1. Introduction 
Twitter is a service which allows users to publish short text messages (tweets) which are shown to other users 
following the author of the message. In case the author is not protecting his tweets, they appear in the so-called 
public timeline and they are served as search results in response to user submitted queries. Thus, Twitter can be a 
source of valuable real-time information and, in fact, several major search engines are including tweets as search 
results.  
Given that tweets are published by individual users, ranking them to find the most relevant information is a 
crucial matter. Indeed, at the moment of this writing, Google seems to be already applying the PageRank method 
to rank Twitter users to that end [47]. Nevertheless, the behavior of different graph centrality methods and their 
vulnerabilities when confronted with the Twitter user graph, in general, and Twitter spammers in particular, are 
still little-known.  
Thus, this paper aims to shed some light on this particular issue besides providing some recommendations for 
future research in the area. As it will be later discussed, user ranking in social networks cannot be an end in 
itself, but a tool to be used for other tasks. Hence, this author is not considering any a priori ―good‖ ranking and, 
instead, he suggest measuring the performance of the different methods on the basis of two desirable features: on 
one hand presumed relevant users should rank atop –although the actual ordering among them is irrelevant; and, 
on the other hand, spammers should achieve lower rankings. 
The paper is organized as follows. First of all, a comprehensive literature review is provided. It deals with 
several rank prestige algorithms (some well-known and others lesser-known) which are applicable to social 
networks; their known vulnerabilities; and some partially related work and proprietary tools outside the scope of 
this study. In addition to that, Twitter spam is discussed with a focus on link spam (known as follow spam in 
Twitter). Then, the different strategies to fight spam in social websites are overviewed. Finally, the research 
questions are stated and the feasibility of ―desensitizing‖ prestige ranking algorithms against follow spam is 
analyzed. After that, the experimental framework in which this study was conducted is described: the dataset 
crawled from Twitter; the elaboration of the subset of relevant and abusive users; and the straightforward nature 
of the evaluation. Afterwards, results obtained with each of the different ranking methods are discussed along 
with the implications of the study. Finally, an in-depth analysis of the collected dataset is provided in an 
appendix: it provides details on the nature of the social network, in addition to some demographical analysis. 
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2. Literature review 
A social network, despite the current association with online services, is any interconnected system whose 
connections are a product of social relations or interactions among persons or groups. That way, families, 
companies, groups of friends, or scientific production are social networks.  
Social networks can be mathematically modeled as graphs and, thus, graph theory has become inextricably 
related to social network analysis with a long history of research. Think, for instance, of bibliometric studies that 
can be traced back to Lotka [37], Gross and Gross [22], Broadman [7], and Fussler [15], although the work by 
Garfield [16] is, with no doubt, the one with the highest impact on the daily life of nowadays scholars. However, 
it is not our aim to provide a survey on this topic; we recommend the reader interested in social network analysis 
from a Web mining perspective the corresponding chapters from the excellent books by Chakrabarti [9] and Liu 
[36]. Instead, for the purpose of this paper it should be enough to briefly sketch the concepts of centrality and 
prestige. 
Both centrality and prestige are commonly employed as proxy measures for the more subtle ones of importance, 
authority, or relevance. Thus, central actors within a social network are those which are very well connected to 
other actors and/or relatively close to them; this way, there exist several measures of centrality such as degree, 
closeness, or betweenness centrality.  
While centrality measures can be computed for both undirected and directed graphs, prestige requires 
distinguishing inbound from outbound connections. Thus, prestige is only applicable to directed graphs which, in 
turn, are the most common when analyzing social networks.  
As with centrality, there are several prestige measures such as indegree (the number of inbound connections, e.g. 
cites, in-links, or followers), proximity prestige (related to the influence domain of an actor, i.e. the number of 
nodes directly or indirectly linking to that actor), and rank prestige, where the prestige of a node depends on the 
respective prestige values of the nodes linking to it –rank prestige is mutually reinforcing and, hence, it requires 
a series of iterations over the whole network. 
Given their importance, and for the sake of clarity, a comparison between the two last prestige measures is 
provided. Proximity prestige is computed as the mean length of all the shortest paths connecting a given node to 
the nodes within its influence domain. In other words, proximity prestige measures reach as the mean number of 
―hops‖ between a node and all of the nodes linked (direct or indirectly) to it. In contrast, rank prestige takes into 
account the prestige of nodes linking (direct or indirectly) to a given node –that’s why it requires iterative 
algorithms– and, in some sense, it describes how well connected is a node to other well connected nodes. 
Rank prestige is, by far, the most commonly used prestige measure and there exist a number of well-known 
methods to compute one or another ―flavor‖ of such a measure. In the following subsection we will briefly 
review the popular PageRank, and HITS algorithms, in addition to lesser-known (although better targeted at 
social media) techniques such as NodeRanking, TunkRank, and TwitterRank, besides their weaknesses in 
different abusive scenarios. 
2.1. Rank prestige algorithms 
2.1.1. PageRank 
PageRank [45] is, in all probability, one of the best known rank prestige methods because it underlies the Google 
search engine [6]. The PageRank algorithm aims to determine a numerical value for each document in the Web, 
such a value would indicate the ―relevance‖ or ―authority‖ of that given document. That value, also known as 
PageRank, spreads from document to document following the hyperlinks –previously it must be divided by the 
number of outgoing links. That way, heavily linked documents tend to have larger PageRank values, and those 
documents receiving few links from highly relevant documents (i.e. documents with large PageRank values) also 
tend to have large PageRank values.  
After iterating a finite (in fact a relatively short) number of steps the algorithm converges; at that moment all the 
nodes within the graph have got a PageRank value by means of which they can be ranked. A notable property of 
the algorithm is that the global amount of PageRank within the graph does not change along the iterations but it 
just spreads from some nodes to other ones. Thus, if the total amount of PageRank in the Web was arbitrarily 
fixed at 1 we could see the PageRank value for a given document as a proxy for the probability of reaching that 
given document by following links at random (that’s why PageRank is often described as a random surfer 
model). Such a model is described by Equation (1) where PR(p) is the PageRank value for webpage p, M(p) is 
the set of webpages linking to p and L(p) is the set of pages linked from p. 
3 
 
 
 
(1) 
Of course, this description is an oversimplification because it makes several unreal assumptions, namely that the 
Web is a strongly connected graph, and that there are no sink nodes (i.e. nodes with in-links but no out-links). In 
order to solve this, a modified version including a damping or teleportation factor is shown in Equation (2): d is 
the damping probability (usually 0.15), and N is the total number of webpages in the graph. 
 
(2) 
2.1.2. HITS 
Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search – HITS [30] is another algorithm to estimate the relevance of a document. The 
method assumes the existence of two different kinds of documents in the Web: authorities and hubs. An 
authority is a heavily linked document because each inbound link is a ―vote‖ cast by the user linking that 
document. Conversely, a hub is a document comprising links to several authorities; therefore, hubs are valuable 
resources in the Web’s ecosystem because they ease users the task of finding relevant information. 
Because webpages can exhibit both characteristics every document in the Web has associated two different 
scores: namely, its authority score and its hub score. It must be noticed that HITS is not aimed to be computed 
across the whole Web graph but, instead, within a query dependent subgraph composed of those documents 
already satisfying a given query (obtained by means of a standard information retrieval system), plus those 
documents linked from, or linking to documents in that result set. 
Therefore, HITS starts with a relatively small Web subgraph and iteratively computes both scores for every page 
in the graph. As it can be seen in Equations (3) and (4) authority and hub scores mutually reinforce themselves; 
the authority score for a given page p is the sum of the hub scores of those pages q linking to p (E is the set of 
edges in the graph) while the hub score for a page p is the sum of the authority weights for those pages q linked 
from p. It must be noticed that with each iteration both scores must be normalized so their squares sum to 1. 
HITS, as PageRank, converges after a number of iterations. 
Finally, although HITS was not devised to compute scores for complete graphs, but rather topic-oriented 
subgraphs, it can of course be applied to a whole graph and, in fact, that is the way in which we are going to 
apply it to the Twitter user graph, using the computed authority scores to rank the users. 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
2.1.3. Abusing HITS and PageRank 
In spite of claims on the original PageRank paper about being “virtually immune to manipulation by commercial 
interests”, the fact is that both PageRank and HITS are prone to manipulation or, at least, they have weaknesses 
that can be exploited under certain circumstances.  
Bharat and Henzinger [5] describe three scenarios were hyperlink analysis methods (a) can be abused, or (b) fail 
because of wrong assumptions. Such scenarios are: (1) mutually reinforcing relationships between hosts, (2) 
automatically generated links, and (3) non-relevant nodes.  
The first case occurs when a document in a host is linked by many documents from a second host; because each 
link is counted as a single vote although they are, in all probability, published by the same author, a single 
individual –the one publishing the links– is earning undue importance. This phenomenon is the underlying base 
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for the so-called link farms which plague the Web, and is also somewhat related to Sybil attacks
2
 in reputation 
based systems (as one could consider Twitter). 
The second scenario does not describe an abusing situation per se, but an assumption made by hyperlink analysis 
methods that eventually proved wrong: that links are published by human beings where many of them are in fact, 
automatically generated
3
. Although not totally equivalent, behaviors in social networks such as auto-following 
users, can for sure bias the results eventually obtained by algorithms such as HITS or PageRank. 
The third and last scenario, namely non-relevant nodes, especially affects HITS. Bharat and Henzinger describe 
how documents not relevant to the query topic can drift the results if they are well connected. In contrast to the 
previous two scenarios, for which we can find comparable situations within a social network setting, this third 
one is a little more elusive. In truth, this situation can only be broadly compared with one of the most common 
spamming behaviors in Twitter, namely getting the more followers the better no matter the relation between the 
contents promoted by the spammer to the potential interests of the eventual followers. 
2.1.4. NodeRanking 
NodeRanking [46] can be considered another variation of the random surfer model with authority spreading from 
one node in the graph to those linked from it. The main differences between NodeRanking and PageRank are 
two: (1) it is devised to work on weighted graphs, and (2) the damping/teleportation parameter is not fixed for 
the whole graph but is computed for each node and depends on the outbound connections of the node (see 
Equation 5). According to its authors, this feature makes NodeRanking “able to adapt dynamically to graphs 
with different topologies.” 
Thus, Equations (5), (6), and (7) underly this algorithm. Pjump(p) is the probability of damping each node p. As it 
can be seen, nodes with few outbound links have a greater probability of being damped; this could be interpreted 
as the random surfer getting bored because of the limited set of choices.  
Pchoose(p), is the probability of a page p to be chosen by the random surfer after visiting page q (which, of course, 
would have a link to p). In the original work by Pujol et al. this equation employs the edge weight from q to p in 
the numerator, and the sum of the weights for all of the links departing from q in the denominator. In this work 
the edges in the social graph are weightless and, thus, we are showing a simplified version of the original 
Pchoose(p) equation: i.e. a web surfer visiting a given page q would continue to any of the p pages linked from q 
with equal probability. 
Finally, equation (7) describes how authority is ―transferred‖ from a node q to a node p linked from q. As it can 
be seen, the authority of q is weighted according to the probability of visiting p after q and then it is accumulated 
on the current authority of p. Since this would cause authority values approaching infinity Pujol et al. introduced 
a correcting factor Fp which depends both on the authority of page p and the total authority of the whole graph 
(this is very similar to the normalization of values required by the HITS algorithm). 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
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2.1.5. TunkRank 
As we have already noticed, both PageRank and HITS (in all probability the most commonly applied methods) 
are prone to manipulation when applied to the Web graph, in general, and to the Twitter user graph (or any other 
social network graph), in particular. Thus, it could be wise to propose methods tailored to the particular 
circumstances of social networks. One of such methods is the one originally proposed by Daniel Tunkelang [51] 
and later named TunkRank for obvious reasons.  
TunkRank defines influence as a numerical estimate for the number of people who will eventually read the tweets 
by a given user (including retweets
4
). The influence for a given user is computed from the influence of his 
followers but taking into account two constrains:  
First, the influence of a user A following a user B is not transmitted in full to B; instead, A distributes his 
influence evenly among all of his followees. The intuition behind this is that attention of users is scarce and must 
be spread; without additional knowledge an even distribution is the most sensible assumption.  
Second, a tweet by user B won’t be read by followers of A unless A retweets it; therefore, since influence is an 
estimator of the reach of a user’s tweets the probability of retweeting (p) must be incorporated. 
Tunkelang suggests computing users’ influence recursively and argues that, although infinite for graphs 
containing cycles, it would converge as powers of p approach zero. In fact, shortly after describing this method 
an implementation for TunkRank was publicly released
5
. 
Equation 8 shows the way in which influence for a given user X can be computed. As it can be seen, the equation 
incorporates all of the aforementioned constrains. The even distribution of attention to followees is expressed by 
means of the denominator, where |Following(Y)| stands for the number of users is following user Y. The 
probability of retweeting, p, appears in the numerator; again, a simplifying assumption was made: such a 
probability is equal for all of the users in Twitter. 
Up to now no rigorous analysis of TunkRank has been performed; however, it seems plausible that, given its 
remarkable similarity to PageRank, it would suffer from many of the weaknesses described above (e.g. Sybil 
attacks, auto-following, and link spamming in general). Hence, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
thorough scholar analysis on TunkRank. 
 
(8) 
2.1.6. TwitterRank 
TwitterRank [52] is an extension to the PageRank method which, in addition to link structure, takes into account 
the topical similarity between users in order to compute the influence one users wield onto the others. In that 
sense, TwitterRank is a topic-sensitive method which ranks users separately for different topics. Thus, in order to 
rank users globally (i.e. with topic independence) one should aggregate every TwitterRank value weighted 
according the difference topic importance within the corpus. 
It must be noticed that, in addition to this, the transition probability among connected users heavily relies in both 
the topical similarity between users, and the number of tweets published not only by the followee, but by all the 
followees the follower is connected to. Certainly, these features make of TwitterRank a highly flexible method 
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that tweet, there RT stands for retweet while the @ followed by the user name is what in Twitter parlance is 
called a mention. Mentions are messages publicly addressed to a given users (in contrast to private messages 
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which, in theory, could easily follow topic drifts. However, we feel that such a degree of flexibility makes the 
algorithm difficult to scale to the number of users and tweets that are published on a daily basis
6
. 
Because of this, and for the sake of better comparison with the rest of rank prestige, we employed a slightly 
modified version of TwitterRank. The differences are the following ones: (1) instead of computing a different 
TwitterRank value for each user and topic to be later aggregated across topics, we aimed to compute just one 
TwitterRank value without relying on any topic. (2) We also changed the topical similarity measure to compare 
users. Instead of applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to find the topics, then obtain each user’s 
distribution, and finally compute Jensen-Shannon Divergence between users’ distributions, we decided to apply 
the much more usual cosine similarity. And lastly, (3) we simplified the way to compute the 
damping/teleportation parameter. In the original paper it was computed from the matrix of users and topics 
obtained by means of LDA; we, in contrast, use the ratio between the number of tweets published by a given 
user and the total number of tweets in the corpus.  
Equations (9) and (10) provide a description of our implementation of TwitterRank. TR(u) is the TwitterRank 
value for user u;  is the probability of teleportation, a constant value between 0 and 1 for the whole graph –we 
used the commonly applied value of 0.15; P(uj,ui) is the transition probability from user uj to user ui; |i| is the 
number of tweets published by user ui, and || is the total number of tweets published by all the users. Lastly, 
sim(uj,ui) is the similarity between users ui and uj which, as we have already said, was implemented as cosine 
similarity. 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
Hence, TwitterRank is indeed an extension of PageRank which takes into account the topical similarity between 
users to weight the transitions among connected users, in addition to the number of tweets the different followees 
publish to establish the influence a user has on its followers. 
2.2. Other methods and tools to compute “influence” 
Apart from the previously described algorithms there have been many other approaches to inferring influence in 
so-called Web 2.0 environments. Most of such approaches rely not only in the user graph, but they also require 
additional information such as user actions (e.g. joining a group, uploading a picture, tagging a resource), or the 
resources and tags collected and labeled by the users in the network. 
For the interested reader we recommend the works by Noll et al. [42] and Goyal et al. [20]. The first one 
describes the SPEAR algorithm (SPamming-resistant Expertise Analysis and Ranking) which processes data 
from a collaborative tagging system (e.g. del.icio.us or bibsonomy) to find the most valuable resources and users 
by means of a mutually reinforcement method. The second one describes different models to determine influence 
among users by exploiting both the social graph and the actions performed by the users within the service.  
With regards to micro-blogging services like Twitter, there are a number of interesting proposals to find 
authoritative users exploiting idiosyncratic features of the service such as retweets or mentions.  
In a seminal work, Cha et al. [8] compared a simple graph-derived measure of influence (indegree) with two 
others better adapted for Twitter: retweets and mentions. According to those authors, users with high indegree 
(i.e. large numbers of followers) do not necessarily produce large numbers of retweets or mentions; in other 
words, indegree does not warrant message spreading. In addition to that, Cha et al. found that users with large 
numbers of followees or with a high tweeting rate were usually robots and spammers. 
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Bakshy et al. [2] followed a different approach to estimate how influential users in Twitter are: they tracked the 
diffusion of URLs across communities of users, and studied the relation between the length of each diffusion 
cascade and a number of features of the user initiating it. The features were the number of followers and 
followees, the number of tweets, the account’s date of creation, and the past influence of the user which was 
based on the length of the cascades started by that user in the past. By training on historical data Bakshy et al. 
tried to predict the length a cascade initiated by a given user would reach. Although they found that past 
influence and large follower base are necessary to start large cascades they are insufficient and, according to 
them, predictions of cascade lengths were relatively unreliable. 
Romero et al. [47] proposed the Inﬂuence-Passivity (I-P) algorithm which is closely related to PageRank, HITS, 
or TunkRank. The I-P algorithm weights the edges of the social graph according to user interactions, concretely, 
retweets. The underlying intuition is very appealing: users’ influence depends on the passivity of their followers 
and, conversely, users’ passivity depends on the influence of their followees. For each pair of users, acceptance 
and rejection rates are computed for the follower; the former is the ratio of received messages s/he retweets 
while the later is the amount of influence s/he rejects. This way, the passivity of a user depends both on his 
rejection rate and the influence of his followees, while his influence depends on the acceptance rate and the 
passivity of his followers. As in HITS, both scores are computed iteratively.  
To test their algorithm, Romero et al. compared the correlation between influence scores (as computed with the 
I-P algorithm) with clickthrough data on URLs promoted in Twitter (i.e. they used clicks as a proxy measure for 
attention). According to them, the I-P algorithm outperforms PageRank, H-index, follower count, and number of 
retweets.  
However, Gayo-Avello et al. [17] argued later that Romero et al. missed the confounding effect of the number of 
followers in both the influence and the clickthrough data. When correcting the data for audience size, Gayo-
Avello et al. did not found any significant correlation between influence computed by means of the I-P 
algorithm and clicks on URLs. However, they did found a significant correlation between clicks and PageRank 
and TunkRank scores. In addition to that, TunkRank outperformed PageRank and a new algorithm devised by 
Gayo-Avello et al. outperformed both of them. That new method does not employ graph data but just relies on 
the mentions received by the users and their follower counts to compute a dynamic measure of influence which 
positively (and significantly) correlates with clicktrough data in promoted URLs.  
Finally, Kwak et al. [32] describe a method to discover influential users in Twitter by analyzing the way in 
which information is diffused across the network. That is, they do not only consider if a user is following another 
one, but which new pieces of information s/he discovers via that followee, and how that user propagates (or not) 
that new information. 
Finally, and for the sake of completeness, it must be noted that there also exist some proprietary tools which 
claim to determine different kinds of influence in Twitter. Among them we can mention Tweet Grader 
(http://tweet.grader.com), Klout (http://klout.com), PeerIndex (http://www.peerindex.com), or 
Twitalyzer (http://twitalyzer.com). Each of them provides one or more metrics which, purportedly, 
portray the influence or authority a user has on other Twitter users. All of them claim to take into account signals 
such as the number of followers, the follower-followee ratio, the number of retweets and mentions received by 
the user, or the connections with other users (and their respective scores). Needless to say, details about how 
each of these tools computes its metrics are undisclosed and, therefore, they cannot be neither replicated nor 
thoroughly analyzed.  
None of the aforementioned methods was considered for this study. The techniques devised in [20][18] or [42] 
could (and should) be adapted to microblogging services such as Twitter but such a goal is out of the scope of 
this paper. In [2] and [32], the social graph is not the most important piece of data, the way in which information 
flows through it is, instead, key. With regards to [17] and [47] the behavior of the users (either retweets or 
mentions) is as important as the social graph or, as is the case of [17], it simply replaces it. Finally, [8] just made 
a point against the use of simplistic graph measures (indegree) as proxies for influence but did not make any 
attempt to correlate retweets and mentions with other external measures of influence. 
Thus, for the purpose of this study, we decided to focus on those methods just relying in the social graph, namely 
HITS, PageRank, NodeRanking, TunkRank, and TwitterRank, in addition to a new method proposed by the 
author of this paper and that is introduced in the following section. 
8 
 
 
2.3. Twitter spam 
“Spam is bad. The amazing degree of unanimity that greets such a simple declaration is, paradoxically, the 
biggest impediment to progress in anti-spam standards.” 
(N. Borenstein, co-creator of MIME) 
The reader has dealt, in all probability, with a fair share of unsolicited e-mails on a great variety of topics, found 
in search results weird webpages that no human could have possibly written, and perhaps read amusing (and 
totally off-topic) comments to blog posts. All of those experiences are qualified under the broad term ―spam‖.  
Twitter is no exception, and spammers have been targeting this service for a number of years. Of course, 
Twitter’s terms of use forbid spamming and there are a number of behaviors the company considers as such: 
―Posting harmful links to phishing or malware sites, repeatedly posting duplicate tweets, and aggressively 
following and un-following accounts to attract attention” [11]. Twitter provides its users with a number of tools 
to pointing out spam accounts which are later checked for misuse and eventually suspended. 
Needless to say, spammers persist and, as in other online services, the adversarial nature of their behavior makes 
spamming a popular research topic. Indeed, several papers on this regard have been recently published, such as 
[4], [28], [34], [48] or [55] just to cite the most relevant.  
For instance, Benevenuto et al. [3] considered spammers those users tweeting URLs unrelated to the topic of the 
tweet. Interestingly, they also state the following: “we do not consider content received through the social links 
as spam since users are free to follow the users they want.” Therefore, only tweets addressed to a user not 
following the spammer would be considered by those authors. 
Lee, Caverlee and Webb [34] described a number of ―families‖: from the purportedly self-describing 
―pornographic spammers‖ and ―phishers‖ to ―promoters‖ (users tweeting a mixture of ―legitimate‖ tweets and 
tweets about online marketing) and ―friend infiltrators‖ (users who massively follow other users to reach a 
certain amount of followers and only then spread spam). 
This is not, however, the only classification for Twitter spammers. Stringhini, Kruegel and Vigna [48] 
distinguished four categories of spammers in social networks (including Twitter): ―displayers‖ (users not posting 
spam but displaying spam on their profile), ―braggers‖ (users posting spam), and ―posters‖ and ―whisperers‖ (the 
former are users addressing spam to other users in plain sight while the later use direct –and private– messages). 
To the aforementioned categories Irani et al. [28] added ―trend-stuffers‖: spammers posting tweets including 
hashtags corresponding to the current trending topics. Such a behavior allows spammers to reach huge audiences 
because trending topics appear prominently in Twitter’s interface and by clicking on them users can read recent 
tweets on that particular topic. 
Needless to say, there have been a number of attempts to characterize and eventually detect spammers in Twitter. 
For instance, Leavitt et al. [33] suggested the follower to followee ratio as a measure to spot ―stereotypical 
spammers‖. According to them, if a user’s ratio approaches zero (i.e. relatively few followers versus relatively 
many followees) would imply that user is a spammer. Unfortunately, spammers are far from stereotypical and 
such a method simply does not work: according to both [4] and [55] spammers have rather high numbers of 
followers. 
Hence, machine learning is the most popular approach: it requires a labeled set of legitimate users and spammers 
to then train a classifier on a number of features obtained from the users in the sample. Among the 
aforementioned researchers [4], [28], [34] and [48] followed that approach using different machine learning 
methods and achieving different precision values: 70% [4], 82% [34] or 97.5% [48].  
It is worth noting that Yardi et al. [55] showed that a rather simple algorithm based on the presence of URLs, 
spam keywords and certain patterns in the user names, was able to achieve 91% precision [55]; this is 
remarkable because such an algorithm makes unnecessary preparing a sample of spammers to train the classifier. 
We will close this section with an operative definition for Twitter spammers consistent with all of previous 
works albeit necessarily broad: 
 A Twitter spammer is a purported user –actually a bot or an instrumented account– with an underlying 
profit-making goal which requires persuading other users to visit one or more websites outside Twitter.  
 To achieve that goal spammers’ tweets tend to contain URLs (usually in a higher proportion than the 
rest of the users). 
 Depending on the profit-making method, the message can range from transparent to overtly fraudulent. 
In other words, if the promoted website is not totally illegal the tweet text can be related to the contents 
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of the website (e.g. weight-loss and diet websites), while if the website is malicious the tweet text 
would be unrelated to the contents of the website (e.g. phishing websites). 
 To maximize the probability of users visiting the promoted websites, spammers require both frequent 
repetition of their messages and huge audiences.  
 To achieve the former they tend to rely on minor modifications to the message; this can be achieved by 
changing the URL using URL shorteners and/or addressing each tweet to a different user.  
 To achieve the later there are two main approaches: (1) spammers can aggressively follow hundreds or 
thousands of users assuming some of them will follow-back thus becoming followers. (2) Spammer can 
include in their tweets hashtags corresponding to current trending topics or habitual Twitter memes. 
Given that users tend to search Twitter by using such hashtags as queries, spammers’ tweets would 
appear as search results having, thus, an opportunity for the promoted website to get clicked. 
 Those spammers engaged in the first approach to get huge audiences risk showing a telltale sign: an 
oddly low follower to followee ratio. Because of this, it’s not uncommon that spammers do not only 
aggressively follow other users but they also unfollow them shortly afterwards. 
Previous description satisfies all of the assumptions made in the aforementioned works about spammers and, 
still, it shows that there are many different kinds of Twitter spammers. They differ on the way they make profit 
(legally or illegally), the nature of the product or service they promote, the way in which they reach their 
audiences, or their method to deliver their promotional messages. 
3. Research motivation 
3.1. Spam countermeasures 
From the literature review regarding Twitter spam it can be concluded that false negatives (uncatched spammers) 
and false positives (legitimate users labeled as spammers) are unavoidable and, even worse, as it was stated in 
[3], [11] or [55] the ―war on spam‖ is a never ending fight because every deployed anti-spam measure will be 
eventually overcome by spammers. 
However, all of those works approach Twitter spam as a detection task while there are other approaches to fight 
it without requiring a detection phase. Here, we will refer to the excellent survey by Heymann, Koutrika and 
Garcia-Molina [26]. According to them, there are three possible countermeasures to spammers: detection, 
demotion and prevention.  
As it has been shown, detection methods have two main problems: false positives and negatives, and knowing 
for sure that spammers will evolve to pass the detection filters. 
Prevention methods aim to make spam posting more difficult. According to Heymann et al. this would require 
limiting automated interaction. CAPTCHAs are one of such measures and they mention it as a way to avoid 
automated account creation; nevertheless, it would be rather annoying requiring CAPTCHAs for every 
interaction in Twitter. In addition to that, although prevention methods can be an interesting approach to limit the 
occurrence of spam in Twitter in the future, they would require major changes to Twitter APIs and user interface 
and, thus, they seem to be of no immediate use in the short term. 
Finally, demotion methods “attempt to lower the ranking of spam in ordered lists” in the words of Heymann et 
al. That is, the system does not prevent nor detect and remove spam or spammers; instead, spam (or spammers) 
should have their prominence reduced. In this sense, they specifically discussed Web search engines which 
suffer the so-called ―spamdexing‖. That kind of spam is defined by Gyöngy and Garcia-Molina [23] as “any 
deliberate human action that is meant to trigger an unjustifiably favorable relevance or importance for some 
web page, considering the page’s true value.”  
A number of similarities can be drawn between Web search and Twitter search scenarios. The volume of 
published information is huge and not curated; anyway, worthwhile information could be available provided it 
could be adequately ranked; hence, there exist an incentive for cheating the eventual ranking algorithm and, 
therefore, spamdexing is a plausible threat.  
Under such circumstances demotion-based methods are much more convenient than detection or prevention 
based ones for a number of reasons:  
 Prevention methods consist of putting barriers to publishing which, at a minimum, are bothersome for 
legitimate users.  
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 Detection methods are enforced only once spammers have plagued the community and besides they 
eventually turn into an ―arm race‖ which makes spammers better and better fitted and, hence, difficult 
to detect in the future.  
 Demotion based methods are akin to ―security by design‖ approaches to software building. That is, 
spammers are taken for granted and the ranking algorithms are envisioned to minimize both the impact 
of spamming actions and collateral effects in legitimate users. 
Needless to say, up to now, ranking algorithms have not been devised to be ―spam proof by design‖; 
consequently, and given that Twitter search is still a rather unexplored field
7
, it is pertinent to study the way in 
which an algorithm could rank relevant users in Twitter while at the same time demoting spammers. 
3.2. The importance of reciprocal linking in Twitter spam 
An operative definition of Twitter spammers was provided above. There, a number of features of spammers were 
described but there is one that deserves closer attention because (1) it is instrumental to the way in which most 
spammers operate in Twitter, and (2) it is somewhat related to the problem of link farming in the Web. 
As it was said, spammers require huge audiences to monetize their messages. Some spammers target so-called 
trending topics in order to ―inject‖ their tweets in the search results of users looking for information about such 
topics. However, the most popular method and, by far, the most widely reported in the literature [3][12][13] 
[18][19][21][40][53][54] is that of following users expecting to be followed back.  
This is also consistent with the findings of this author: Table 4 reveals that spammers use of hashtags is 
significantly higher than that of other users; however, spam tweets with hashtags are far from being the majority 
of their tweets and, thus, most of the spammers are counting on his followers as their main audience. 
This behavior has been denoted by Twitter as ―follow spam‖ [53] and it exploits the fact that many users tend to 
follow back any other user who starts following them [3][40].  
Indeed, it has been reported that sophisticated spammers do not only target those users more prone to follow 
back [18][19] but they also unfollow those that do not reciprocate the following [3][12][40]. 
Hence, although reciprocation could be thought of as a sign of mutual interests or even actual friendship, it has 
been actually found that spammers and other fraudulent accounts exhibit higher reciprocation than average users 
[18][54].  
In fact, spammers are getting their followers from a relatively small subset of Twitter users (about 100,000 
accounts) who have huge follower bases and routinely follow back all of them [19]. In this regard, follow spam 
is related to link spam in the Web (a subclass of spamdexing, see [23]) and could be tackled with in similar 
ways: indeed, Ghosh et al. [19] described CollusionRank, an algorithm similar to TrustRank [24], to assign 
spamminess scores to Twitter users starting from a seed of known spammers. 
So, in short, among the different features that can help to characterize spammers in Twitter, reciprocal linking, or 
follow spam, seems to be instrumental and, as it has been said, algorithms based on the fact that spammers rely 
on such reciprocal links have successfully spotted unknown spammers [19]. 
Needless to say, such linking behavior can also be seen in other users and, hence, its mere presence would not 
immediately point out a user as a spammer. Moreover, as it has been argued before, although spam detection is 
unavoidable in the Web, Twitter is relatively new and there is still room for taking a demotion based approach 
against spam which, as discussed above, is far more convenient than a separated detection phase. 
3.3. Research questions 
Social networks are increasingly gaining importance in the day-to-day living of Internet users, and the contents 
they provide can be exploited to provide up-to-date information (the so-called real-time web). Needless to say, 
because of the ease of publishing any content, anytime by anyone, it is ever more important to have a way to 
separate trustworthy/relevant/authoritative sources of information from the untrustworthy/irrelevant/un-
authoritative.  
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Given the prior success of applying rank prestige algorithms to bring order to the Web, it seems appealing to do 
the same with the user graphs from social networks.  
However, as it has been shown above, ranking algorithms can be abused (for instance through spamdexing and 
link farming) and, in fact, spammers following similar approaches (the so-called follow spam) are already 
operating in Twitter. 
Besides, although there is a large body of work regarding spam detection in the Web, spam demotion can be a 
more convenient approach given that spammers have not been abusing Twitter for too long.  
In this sense, there is still a ―window of opportunity‖ to study to what degree ranking algorithms proposed up to 
date are spam proof (or at least spam tolerant), and the feasibility of trying to make them more robust to 
spammers. 
Also, and as it has been aforementioned, reciprocal linking (follow spam in Twitter, link spam in the Web) is 
instrumental for spammers and, hence, that behavior (typical in spammers but also in other users) has been put at 
the core of the research described in this study. 
Therefore, the main research questions addressed in this study can be stated as follows:  
1) How vulnerable to follow spam are common graph methods when applied to user graphs from online 
social networks?  
2) Is it possible to ―desensitize‖ such algorithms in a way that avoids to detect and filter out spammers 
after computing the ranks, but that, instead, take into account their presence and minimize their 
influence? 
It must be said that in addition to the graph centrality methods studied in the Literature Review this report 
includes an analysis of a variation of the popular PageRank method which, purportedly, should be less sensitive 
to link abusing in social networks.  
Such a variation, which will be thoroughly described in the following subsection, relies on a deweighting factor 
computed from the reciprocal links between users. In contrast to previous solutions, this variation incorporates 
information about reciprocal links during the ranking computation to avoid a prior spam detection phase while, 
hypothetically, demoting spammers anyway. 
3.4. A rationale for “desensitizing” prestige ranking methods against link spamming 
As we have previously exposed, one of the simplest prestige measures in a network is indegree which translated 
to Twitter terms is the total number of people following a user. A priori it seems a reasonable approach: as 
Leavitt et al. pointed out, “the more followers a user possess, the more impact he appears to make in the Twitter 
environment, because he seems more popular.”  
Users such as Oprah Winfrey (3.1M followers), CNN Breaking News (2.9M followers), or TIME (2M 
followers)
8
 are almost expected to have such huge number of followers; after all, they are opinion-makers and 
mass media. One could even find reasons to explain the number of followers for Ashton Kutcher (4.5M), Britney 
Spears (4.4M), or Lady Gaga (2.8M): they are celebrities, fans are eager to know about their idols and feel they 
are in contact with them, etc. Which is harder to understand is how can spammers have far more followers than 
average users (Yardi et al. 2010; see also Section 4.2 for more details on this). 
An explanation for such a phenomenon has been provided above: As with any other social environment, Twitter 
has seen the emergence of its own etiquette and, for many users, following back a new follower is considered 
―good manners‖. Of course, such a behavior is not a problem per se and, in fact, it makes perfect sense: if 
somebody starts following you, it means (in theory) s/he is interested in what you are tweeting about; probably 
both of you have some common interests and, thus, it would be a good idea to follow-back that user to see what 
s/he is publishing. 
Needless to say, many users are just following back their new followers as a matter of custom and many of them 
are using different tools and scripts to auto-follow back their followers
9
. Once spammers took notice of this 
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behavior it was relatively easy to get followers: spammers just needed to massively follow other users. It must be 
said that Twitter consider this a violation of their terms of use but spammers (and many users in general) are 
using this and other related methods to increase their follower count. 
Hence, it seems that number of followers is not to be trusted when trying to infer a user’s relevance. Indeed, we 
have already said that Leavitt et al. [33] suggested that the ratio between the number of a user’s followers and 
the number of his followees is a better metric.  
According to these authors, if this ratio approaches infinity the user is a successful broadcaster, “moving content 
to other users in the environment.” For instance, Oprah has a follower-followee ratio of 1.67·105, CNN Breaking 
News of 1.04·10
5
, TIME 2.19·10
4
, Ashton Kutcher 1.47·10
4
, Lady Gaga 18.08, and Britney Spears 10.43. 
To the contrary, if the ratio tends to zero Leavitt et al. qualify that user as a “stereotypical spammer”; 
nevertheless, [4] and [55] have found that spammers do not fulfill such a stereotype. In fact, the follower-
followee ratio for spammers tends to be close to 1 and, actually, many of them manage to have a positive ratio 
indeed. With regards to common users it varies widely but, as an example, the ratio for this author is a meager 
1.30. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Three archetypical scenarios in a social network like Twitter. From left to right: an opinion-maker, a 
user with a close group of friends, and a user making connections by means of link exchanges (i.e. a probable 
spammer). 
Figure 1 illustrates these three common scenarios. The first one is the typical case for a celebrity/mass-media: 
s/he has got lots of followers plus a few followees
10
. The second case shows the archetypical user with a close 
group of friends or relatives in addition to a few followees outside that group. In this scenario there are lots of 
connections between the users in the close group and relatively few outside. Lastly, the third scenario shows a 
user who has managed to get followers by mass following other users and who, in fact, has managed to have a 
few more followers than followees
11
. In these toy examples the follower-followee ratio is 1.75 for the heavy-
followed user, 0.67 for the user with a close group of friends, and 1.14 for the presumptive spammer. 
Nevertheless, let’s put aside spammers for a moment so we can pay a little more attention to the follower-
followee ratio. Is it just an ad hoc heuristic? Or, on the contrary, does it provide any sensible (and useful) 
reading? In our opinion it can be interpreted as the user’s ―value‖ regarding the introduction of new original 
information from the outside world into the Twitter global ecosystem. Those users which publish valuable tweets 
get followers who do not mind if those users are ―impolite‖ (i.e. they do not follow back); that way they have 
huge number of followers but small numbers of followees and, thus, their ratios tend to be large. On the other 
hand, users who tend to discuss relatively personal matters with their close group of acquaintances do not get 
large audiences and, in turn, their ratios tend to be small (even close to zero if they follow lots of people). 
But there is the spam problem. How should we tackle with it? As it was pointed above, the answer may lie on 
reciprocal connections, those where two users are following each other. As we have said, many users consider 
this a sign of politeness but, many, especially those with huge numbers of followers, simply cannot follow-back 
everybody (not if they want to actually read what their followees are writing). Spammers, however, are no 
reading tweets and, thus, they have no constrain in the number of people to follow; especially if they aim to get a 
new follower in reciprocity.  
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In other words, reciprocal links should be under suspicion because many times they are used as ―counterfeit 
currency‖ to increase the followers count. In consequence, we propose the follower-followee ratio with 
discounted reciprocity –see Equation (11)– which, in our opinion, captures many of the subtleties of linking in 
social networks. 
 
(11) 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The same three scenarios from Figure 1 but ―discounting‖ reciprocal connections. As it can be seen 
heavy-followed users are hardly affected while those users with many reciprocal connections such as small 
groups and spammers tend to ―lose‖ most of their inbound links. 
Figure 2 shows the same three scenarios from Figure 1 but reciprocal connections are shown in a lighter shade. 
Those users with many of such connections, namely spammers and common users, tend to ―lose‖ most of their 
followers, while heavy-followed users are virtually unaffected. The crux of the matter is that, although for users 
in small close communities this could go undetected, spammers would find such a thing undesirable. 
On the other hand, putting under suspicion all reciprocal links seems a bit obnoxious; that’s why we don’t 
suggest using this ratio ―as is‖ but, instead, employing either the follower-followee ratio or the discounted 
version depending on the possible outcome: if a user would ―benefit‖ of using the original ratio then we use the 
discounted one, and vice versa. Because of that, the whole name for the proposed ratio is in fact followers to 
followee ratio with paradoxical discounted reciprocity (Equation 12). For sure this can look a bit nonsensical at 
first but, as we are about to show, it makes perfect sense.  
First, let’s take two users: one of them, legit, has 34,000 followers and 300 followees with 200 reciprocal 
connections; the other one, spammer, has 25,000 followers and 30,000 followees with 20,000 reciprocal links. 
The ratios for them would be 113.33 and 0.83, respectively. The ratios with discounted reciprocity would be 338 
and 0.5, respectively. If the users could choose which ratio they prefer to describe themselves it seems clear that 
legit would prefer discounted reciprocity which is larger, while spammer would prefer the raw ratio.  
However, such selfish decisions are contrary to the interpretation of the ratios. That is, legit would prefer 
assuming his reciprocal connections are not legitimate but follow spam. On the other hand, spammer would 
prefer to count all his reciprocal connections as truly legitimate while, in all probability, this is not the case (you 
cannot simply follow thirty thousand people). However, both users could get us to apply the opposite ratio. For 
instance, spammer could unfollow 20 thousand people to achieve a 2.5 ratio; however, such massive unfollowing 
would probably make him lost most of his followers. And what about legit? He could massively follow most of 
his followers but, independently of the ratio to apply, such an action would only reduce his final value. Thus it 
does not seem that neither legit nor spammer would change their connections just to force a different way to 
compute their respective ratios.  
 
(12) 
Finally, the paradoxical discounted ratio is not aimed to be directly applied to users in the graph but, instead, as a 
weight within another algorithm such as PageRank. For the sake of illustration, we will discuss here how to 
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modify the original PageRank equation (see Eq. 1) in addition to other minor considerations to take into account 
for implementation. 
Equation 13 corresponds to the incorporation of the paradoxical discounted ratio to PageRank. As it can be seen, 
for each page pj linking to page pi its PageRank score –PR(pj)– is weighted according to the number of outgoing 
links from pj and, in this modified version, its paradoxical discounted ratio. Please note that the value for the 
ratio is normalized according to the maximum reached by all the nodes in the graph (remember that the value is 
always positive but unbounded). 
By doing this, the ratio is playing the role of an externality, that is, it has an impact not on the agent responsible 
of its value but on third persons. In other words, a user is not affected by his own ratio, his followees are (the 
prestige they received is de-weighted). From an economic point of view this is an appealing feature because 
individual spammers do not have any incentive to modify their personal behavior, although as a group –they tend 
to weave tight networks– all of them lose out. 
The only final consideration when incorporating the paradoxical discounted ratio to a given algorithm is that the 
scores for each page must be normalized after each iteration (otherwise they would decrease towards zero).  
 
(13) 
4. Research design 
The main goal of this study was to compare the performance of different rank prestige algorithms when applied 
to social networks. To attain that, a relative large dataset was needed, in addition to an objective criterion against 
which to compare the performance of the different methods. The dataset, described in the following subsection, 
was crawled by the author from Twitter. Within that dataset two different subsets were prepared: one of 
presumed relevant users and another of abusive users.  
The second subset was needed because the research questions underpinning this study deal with the vulnerability 
of centrality methods to spammers and the feasibility of ―desensitizing‖ them to their abusive behavior. As it was 
said a desirable feature of any ranking algorithm would be that of demoting abusive users and, the lower the 
scores for spammers the better the algorithm. 
Nevertheless, although demoting spammers is a desirable feature for a ranking algorithm it is not its main goal; 
ranking relevant users atop is: the higher the ranks for those users the better the algorithm. That is the reason for 
the first subset of users which, along with the subset of abusive users, will be described below. 
Thus, this section describes the dataset employed for the research, the way in which subsets of presumably 
relevant and abusive users were extracted, and the simple evaluation method applied to compare the different 
algorithms. 
4.1. Dataset description 
We relied on the Twitter search API to create the dataset used in this study. To that end, we employed a query 
composed of frequent English stop words (e.g. the, of, and) in addition to forcing the results to just include 
tweets written in English. That query was submitted once every minute from January 26, 2009 to August 31, 
2009. Needless to say, the crawling was not flawless and, in fact, there were 18 days with minor network 
blackouts and 3 days with no tweets at all (April 26, and August 22 and 24). All in all, we collected 27.9 million 
English tweets corresponding to 214 days.  
As we have already implied, users in Twitter can involve themselves in relationships with other users. Thus, a 
user can follow another one so that the first user can receive the tweets published by the second. This way, users 
can have, in Twitter parlance, followers and friends. Please notice that friends are no more than the persons a 
given user is following; hence we are using the term followee instead [27]. 
Using that information on followers and followees, Twitter can be represented as a directed graph. In order to 
build such a graph we tried to obtain followers and followees for each of the 4.98 million users appearing in the 
dataset. To do that, we employed the so-called Social Graph Methods provided by the Twitter API. This second 
crawl was performed after the first dataset was collected and took several months.  
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For the final graph we did not take into consideration links from/to users not appearing in the sample and we also 
dropped isolated users. In addition to this, a substantial amount of user accounts were suspended
12
 at the moment 
of the second crawl and, hence, no information on these users’ followers and followees was available. Lastly, 
because of the unavoidable network problems, coupled with the fact that we pushed the API a little too far, the 
information for a noticeable amount of users was not eventually crawled.  
The finally collected Twitter graph consisted of 1.8 million users; that is, 36% of the users within the original 
sample. It is bigger than other datasets reported in the literature (e.g. Java et al. [29] –about 90,000 users– or 
Choudhury et al. [10] –200,000 users) but smaller than others (e.g. Kwak et al. [31] –41.7 million users, the 
whole Twitter graph as of July 2009). Anyway, we think it is a fairly substantial sample given that, at the 
moment of collecting the dataset, the number of U.S. Twitter users was estimated between 14 [43] and 18 
millions [44] and, thus, our sample is 10% that size and covers a little more than 4% of the whole Twitter graph. 
An in-depth analysis of this dataset is provided as an Appendix for the interested reader. 
4.2. Data preparation: relevant users 
The goal of applying a ranking algorithm to a social network is to find the most relevant users that should appear 
atop. Hence, if only we were able to find a ranked list of users to be used as a ground truth, it would be 
straightforward to compare the different algorithms. Needless to say, we could rely on lists similar to those of 
Forbes magazine but there are a number of problems with them: 
 Although there is some overlap between such lists and the Twitter user base, not every person in those 
lists is using Twitter and not every relevant Twitter account is a person. 
 Despite the claims made by their proponents about using a methodology they are highly debatable at 
least and they would be hard to justify in a scientific paper. 
 The very idea of ranking users may be considered preposterous even when focusing in a very specific 
field. For instance, what would be a ―right‖ ranking for actors and actresses? Or for entrepreneurs? 
That does not mean, however, that there is no way to find a subset of users against which to test the performance 
of the different algorithms. It means that, firstly, we should focus on Twitter’s ecosystem and, secondly, we do 
not need to have that group internally ordered or ranked but, instead, we need to have that group ranked atop as a 
whole to say that a ranking algorithm is properly working. 
From such a perspective there is a group of users that can help our purposes: celebrities. Such a group is 
composed of actors, news anchors, politicians, sport figures, etc. and, depending on the different interests of the 
audience, they can be considered relevant. Moreover, all of them share a problem: to warrant their followers that 
they are who they seem. Besides, the problem is not only theirs but also of Twitter: by not properly handling 
deceptive accounts of celebrities the company could very well get involved in libel lawsuits.  
Hence, Twitter is proactively verifying accounts to check they actually belong to the celebrity they claim. 
Verified accounts display a characteristic ―badge‖ in Twitter’s interface and can be also checked thanks to the 
@verified Twitter account.  
Needless to say, the number of verified accounts is relatively small (29,799 users out of 500 million users as of 
June 26, 2012) but, given the nature of those users, it is clear that any sensible ranking algorithm should provide 
them the highest scores. 
Therefore, using Twitter’s API all the available verified accounts were obtained and checked against the 
collected dataset. Of course, not all of them were present in the dataset: some of the verified accounts are not 
tweeting in English and many of them did not exist at the moment of the data collection (2009). Nevertheless, 
4,884 verified accounts were found in the dataset, a 0.3% of the total number of users; this is a relatively small 
number but it is highly significant given that only 30 thousand users from the 500 million user base in Twitter 
has got a verified account. 
Using a likelihood-ratio test in a way analog to that of [29] we obtained a list of distinctive terms (see Table 1) 
from the biographies of verified accounts found in the dataset. As it can be seen, despite the presence of the 
―verified badge‖, it is pretty common to emphasize that the account is the official channel of communication in 
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Twitter for that user. In addition to that, other phrases reveal that companies, news media outlets, politicians, 
artists and sport figures comprise the majority of verified accounts. 
With regards to their tweeting behavior, Table 4 provides details and comparison with both spammers and 
average users; nevertheless, a summary of the most interesting features is provided here. As it was expected, 
verified accounts have huge follower bases and they follow thousands of accounts, much more than the average 
user and somewhat between spammers and aggressive marketers. They tweet much more than average users and, 
again, they are in between spammers and aggressive marketers in this regard. They use URLs much more than 
average users but much less than spammers. They use hashtags much less than average users, marketers and 
spammers which could suggest that verified accounts (i.e. celebrities) prefer not embrace with mass movements. 
Instead, they retweet much more than average users (although less than marketers) and get much involved in 
conversations than any other group of users; this could imply that they are really trying to personally interact 
with their followers. 
official 
official twitter 
news 
twitter page 
band 
new album 
twitter account 
in stores now 
espn 
updates 
singer 
congressional district 
latest news 
twitter feed 
team 
songwriter 
new york times 
cnn 
on tour 
host 
tweets 
exclusive 
fox news 
singer songwriter 
correspondent 
recording artist 
news commentary 
legal notice 
anchor 
congressman 
nba 
comedian 
dj 
tv 
olympic gold medalist 
producer 
follow us 
nfl 
official home 
yahoo 
records 
governing body 
television 
world's leading 
actress 
nbc 
mtv 
espn football 
tips 
twitter channel 
gov 
washington 
spiegel online 
email 
the guardian 
official tweets 
fox sports 
grammy 
the leading 
rock band 
Table 1. The 60 most distinctive terms appearing in biographies of verified accounts. 
4.3. Data preparation: abusive users 
As we have described in the Research motivation section, in addition to obtain sensible rankings for relevant 
users, we are interested in the feasibility of rank prestige methods less vulnerable to linking malpractice
13
. This 
question is highly pertinent because one or more of such methods will certainly be used to rank users to find the 
most relevant/trustworthy content producers. In fact, at the moment of this writing Google seems to be already 
applying its PageRank method to rank Twitter users [47] in order to offer the most relevant tweets as search 
results. 
We have already said that a desirable feature of ranking algorithms is that of demoting spammers. Hence, to 
compare different algorithms and test their respective performance we need a group of users who are actually 
trying to abuse Twitter linking. As many other so-called social services, Twitter is no immune to the spam 
problem. In addition to promoting dubious websites and products, Twitter spammers are also furiously engaged 
in getting followers; in fact, they have both more followees and followers than legitimate users. According to 
Yardi et al. (2010), they triple the number of both kinds of connections; these authors argue that ―spammers 
invest a lot of time following other users (and hoping other users follow them back)”. An explanation we found 
highly plausible. 
Whether this is done on purpose, anticipating the application of prestige algorithms to the user graph or, 
conversely, it is just a happy coincidence when spammers were just trying to find users to click the links they 
publish is irrelevant. The matter is that those spurious connections are to be treated by the eventual algorithm in 
the same way that legitimate links and, thus, spammers can obtain an undeserved authority within the user graph. 
Thus, to collect the necessary data for the experiments, a method was needed to detect spammers. In Section 2 it 
was explained that machine learning methods are an option but they require a sample of both legitimate users 
and spammer for training and, on top of that, it was shown that the simple algorithm proposed by Yardi et al. 
provided a similar performance. Thus, such a method was chosen. The algorithm is based on the presence of 
URLs and a selection of keywords in the tweets, in addition to the matching of certain pattern in the user 
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 i.e. Creating links to earn reputation by exploiting knowledge about the algorithm instead of creating links as 
the naturally expected outcome of daily use of the service. 
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names
14
. Thus, we implemented an analogous version of their technique achieving similar performance: 87.32% 
precision versus the 91% reported by them. 
That spam detection system detected 9,369 spammers in our collection of tweets. By examining a representative 
sample we found that about 24% of those users were already suspended by Twitter
15
, 21% of them were 
promoting “money making” techniques, about 11% were “copywriters” (i.e. they replicate content from other 
users, RSS feeds or publish plagiarized websites), 8% promote methods to get followers and/or website traffic, 
and the rest of them are a mixture of self-proclaimed experts in SEO, marketing, weight loss, etc. 
In a similar way to that of verified accounts, spammers biographies were mined to find distinctive terms (see 
Table 2 for a more exhaustive list). As it was expected, terms such as business, money, internet marketing, social 
media and SEO were at the top of the list. It must be noticed that those terms are not only popular among 
spammers but among other Twitter users. As [55] said of them “[they] tread a fine line between reasonable and 
spam-like behavior in their efforts to gather followers and attention”. We will denote those users as aggressive 
marketers and, thus, we decided to expand the group of abusive users from pure spammers to also include those 
marketers
16
. 
To find them we prepared a list of terms commonly occurring in spammer biographies which were also 
frequently associated with marketers and other heavy-following users. By doing so, we found another 22,290 
users which cannot be labeled as spammers but, we thought, could exhibit some abusive behavior with regards to 
connecting to other users. Table 3 shows a list of the 60 most distinctive terms for these aggressive marketers; 
please notice the degree of coincidence with spammers. 
Of course, a mere similarity in biographies is not evidence of aggressive marketers trying to abuse Twitter. 
Because of that, we analyzed several characteristics of tweeting behavior for both spammers and aggressive 
marketers, and compared them to those of average Twitter users and verified accounts. Table 4 contains all the 
details and, thus, we will just summarize the most interesting findings.  
First, spammers have both much more followers and followees than average users (although less than verified 
accounts). This is consistent with the findings of Yardi et al. However, in our datasets spammers do not triple 
those numbers with regards to common users, but they multiply them by almost 40! Aggressive marketers are in 
between but much closer to spammers than to the average twitterer: they have about 15 times the number of 
connections than an average user. 
With regards to the number of tweets published, aggressive marketers double the frequency of average users and 
spammers publish 7 times the number of tweets an average user does. This probably means that spammers, in 
contrast to marketers, are publishing tweets in an automatic fashion.  
Regarding different features of the tweets themselves there are some important differences between spammers, 
marketers, and average users. Firstly, virtually every tweet published by a spammer contains a URL (90%); 
marketers use URLs in one in three tweets, while average users tend to use URLs in about one in five tweets. 
Secondly, both marketers and spammers employ hashtags more than average users but the differences, although 
substantial, are not as pronounced as with other features. Surprisingly, the number of hashtags include by these 
different groups is mostly the same on average. Lastly, one feature that again highlights the robot nature of most 
spammers is the much lower level of retweeting, in particular, and conversations they get involved, in general. 
As it was expected, marketers are much more prone to retweet than average users (two times) and also get much 
more involved in conversations than them. 
To sum up, we have described two similar, albeit not identical, groups of abusive users –namely spammers and 
marketers– which exhibit several features very different from those of average users and verified accounts. Both 
have further more followers and followees than the average user, both publish more than average users, and both 
promote URLs more than average users. Besides, as we have stated above, the line between aggressive marketers 
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 Kwak et al. (2010) employed a different mechanism: labeling as spam those tweets including one or more 
trending topics. In addition to require additional knowledge (i.e. knowing which are the trending topics at a 
given time) there is also another problem with this approach: as we will show later, the average number of 
hashtags (usually appearing in trending topics) is well down below 3, even for spammers. 
15
 Needless to say, one of the main reasons for account suspension in Twitter is spamming behavior. 
16
 It must be noted that Lee, Caverlee and Webb [34] considered aggressive marketers a subclass of spammers; 
they called them ―promoters‖. 
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and spammers is not always totally clear. In fact, one could assume that relatively few users will respond to the 
stereotypical spammer profile and, to the contrary, many users would exhibit a more or less marked spamming 
behavior. 
Anyway, and spite of being an oversimplification, for the purpose of evaluating the different graph centrality 
algorithms with regards to spammers demotion we are going to consider a single group spammers-marketers 
assuming that their linking behavior, as a whole, is trying to abuse, or at least cheat, the assumptions underlying 
relationships in Twitter: i.e. that users should follow one another when they are genuinely interested in what that 
the other is publishing. Thus, in the following sections we are going to analyze in which way the global 
authority/reputation is divided among the different groups (verified accounts, spammers-marketers and the rest 
of users), and which algorithms are less prone to be abused while, at the same time, providing a better ranking of 
relevant users within the social network. 
marketing 
internet 
marketer 
online 
business 
money 
social 
internet marketer 
internet marketing 
social media 
entrepreneur 
affiliate 
network 
media 
seo 
free 
help 
deals 
make money 
real estate 
forex 
coach 
home 
real 
news 
money online 
helping 
tips 
affiliate marketing 
web 
expert 
investor 
people 
network marketing 
mlm 
blog 
traffic 
success 
online marketing 
network marketer 
affiliate marketer 
making money 
online business 
estate investor 
small business 
online marketer 
weight loss 
trump network 
helping others 
media marketing 
marketing coach 
money making 
help people 
forex trading 
helping people 
home based 
home business 
internet entrepreneur 
forex trader 
business coach 
Table 2. The 60 most distinctive terms appearing in Twitter spammers biographies. 
entrepreneur 
marketing 
internet 
real estate 
estate 
real 
marketer 
online 
business 
internet marketing 
helping 
internet marketer 
seo 
money 
online marketing 
consultant 
social 
people 
helping people 
media 
social media 
affiliate 
marketing consultant 
web 
small business 
coach 
help 
network 
free 
investor 
small 
others 
helping others 
success 
media marketing 
help people 
entreprenuer (sic) 
broker 
realtor 
estate investor 
network marketing 
estate agent 
agent 
make money 
expert 
owner 
home 
affiliate marketing 
online marketer 
follow 
business owner 
speaker 
guru 
estate broker 
search 
sem 
ppc 
successful 
blogger 
network marketer 
Table 3. The 60 most distinctive terms appearing in aggressive marketers biographies. Those terms in bold also 
appear in the top-60 list for spammers. 
 Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers Average user 
Avg. in-degree 34784.36 3203.28 1338.83 82.36 
Avg. out-degree 1412.80 3156.09 1245.35 82.36 
Avg. # of tweets over the 
whole period and SD 
15.29 (32.74) 41.25 (80.99) 12.93 (34.07) 5.60 (19.45) 
% of tweets including 
URLs 
31.11% 90.42% 32.86% 18.21% 
Avg. # of URLs per tweet 
including URLs 
1.013 1.018 1.015 1.014 
% of tweets including 
hashtags 
7.01% 11.54% 8.83% 7.98% 
Avg. # of tags per tweet 
including hashtags 
1.25 1.41 1.42 1.50 
% of retweets over total 
tweets 
4.87% 2.97% 6.50% 2.87% 
% of “conversations” 
over total (excluding 
retweets) 
32.88% 6.86% 21.48% 19.26% 
Avg. # of users referred 
in conversational tweets 
(excluding retweets) 
1.13 1.17 1.13 1.09 
Table 4. Features characterizing verified accounts, spammers, aggressive marketers, and average users. 
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4.4. Evaluation method 
As we have already said we are not assuming any prior ―correct‖ ranking for the users; we consider user 
rankings just a tool to find the most relevant source of information at a given time and, thus, a ranking algorithm 
will be judged by its ability to rank atop relevant users as a whole while avoiding abusive users achieving 
undeserved rankings.  
Hence, the evaluation process is quite straightforward. All of the different methods were applied to the Twitter 
graph to obtain a user ranking. Then, we compared the positions reached by spammers and marketers on one 
side, and verified accounts on another side. The lower the rankings abusive users reach while the higher for 
verified accounts, the better the method is.  
In the following section we provide the minimum, average, and median positions for the different user classes 
across different deciles. Such numbers will help to understand the positioning of both verified accounts and 
abusive users in relation to the rest of users in the social network. In addition to that, we will graphically show 
the percentage of verified accounts atop the ranks, the percentage of abusive users found as one moves down the 
ranking, and the level of agreement between the different rankings. 
5. Results 
5.1. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying PageRank 
As it has been aforementioned, 4,884 verified accounts appear in the collected dataset. They amount for a mere 
0.3% of the users in the graph but, still, they accumulate 12.7% of the total PageRank in the graph. Regarding 
their positioning in the global ranking (see Table 5, and Figures 3 and 4), 85% of the verified accounts appear 
among the top 10% of users. 
With regards to the subset of abusive users, about 50% of the spammers detected in the collection of tweets did 
not appear in the graph
17
. Those who are present account for 0.25% of the users but they agglutinate 1.4% of the 
total PageRank in the graph. Regarding the aggressive marketers, 98% of them appear in the graph accounting 
for 3.3% of the total PageRank. The acute difference from spammer to marketer presence in the graph gives an 
idea of the work devoted by Twitter to get rid of spammers. 
Thus, the whole set of spammers and marketers which represent a mere 1.5% of the users manage to grab 4.7% 
of the available PageRank.  
With regards to their positioning in the global ranking (see Figures 5 and 6), 90% of spammers are, 
approximately, among the 60% of top ranked users and, in fact, half of the spammers appear well above the top 
10% of Twitter users. On the other hand, 90% of the aggressive marketers are among the 80% of top ranked 
users and half of them appear above the top 20% of users.  
5.2. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying HITS 
When applying HITS to the Twitter user graph verified accounts grab 1.65% of the available authority rank 
while spammers grab 5.20% and aggressive marketers account for another 11%. Thus, a reduce subset of users 
(1.5% of them) which are on top of that abusive own 16.20% of the global authority outscoring verified accounts 
(i.e. relevant users).  
Both spammers and marketers are pretty good positioned (see Table 6). Half of the spammers appear at the top 
10% of positions and 90% of them are among the 40% better situated users. Aggressive marketers’ situation is 
not as good but equally impressive: half of them appear at the top 20% positions, and 90% of them are among 
the 60% better positioned users. 
With regards to verified accounts, almost half of them appear at the top 10% positions and 90% of them are 
among the top 40% better ranked users. This, however, is not very different of the rankings achieved by 
spammers and marketers. 
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 Let’s remember that the user graph was crawled once the collection of tweets was completed. 
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5.3. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying NodeRanking 
When ranking users according to NodeRanking, verified accounts reach 11.94% of the global available prestige 
while spammers and aggressive marketers account for 1.62% and 3.86%, respectively. The amounts reached by 
abusive users are about 15% larger than those achieved when using PageRank while the prestige grabbed by 
verified accounts is slightly lower. 
With regards to their positioning (see Table 7), 90% of verified accounts appear near the top 15% users, and half 
of them are among the top 2% of users. With regards to abusive users, 90% of the spammers are among the 60% 
best situated users and half of them appear at the top 10% positions. 90% of the aggressive marketers are above 
30% of the users and half of them are among the top 20% users. Such results are pretty similar to those obtained 
by applying standard PageRank.  
5.4. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying TunkRank 
When ranking Twitter users according to TunkRank
18
, verified accounts grab 21.47% of the available global 
prestige while spammers and aggressive marketers account for 0.74% and 1.94%, respectively. Hence, the 
amount grabbed by abusive users is roughly half the one obtained when applying PageRank while the amount 
reached by verified accounts is 69% larger. 
Attending to their positioning (see Table 8), 90% of verified accounts are at the top 15%, and half of them are at 
the top 1%. In contrast, 90% of the spammers are among the 70% of best positioned users, and half of them 
appear above the top 20%. Regarding aggressive marketers, there are no great differences between them and 
common users, although half of them are above the 40% top positioned users. 
5.5. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying TwitterRank 
When ranking Twitter users according to TwitterRank, verified accounts reach 9.12% of the available global 
prestige. In contrast, spammers and aggressive marketers account for 0.0003% and 0.00025%, respectively. In 
other words, using TwitterRank, both groups of abusive users reach a virtually negligible prestige (although, 
again, spammers manage to outperform marketers).  
With regards to their positioning (see Table 9), 90% of verified accounts are roughly among the top 60% users, 
and half of them are among the top 20%. Surprisingly, 90% of the spammers are among the top 30% users and 
half of them appear among the 10% best positioned users. Aggressive marketers, on the other hand, seem to be 
slightly better positioned than average users. 
The reason for these apparently contradictory results (namely, the impressive prestige reduction for spammers 
while still achieving top positions) is that TwitterRank distributes the prestige in a highly biased way: in fact, top 
10 users account for 77% of the prestige and top 25 users for 95.5%
19
. That is, virtually all of the users in the 
network achieve no prestige at all and, in spite of that, spammers manage to be ―one-eyed kings in the land of the 
blind‖ even outperforming a large number of verified accounts. 
5.6. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying PageRank with 
paradoxical discounting 
When applying PageRank with paradoxical discounting to the Twitter user graph, verified accounts grab 10.87% 
of the global PageRank while spammers can only grab 0.22% and aggressive marketers account for 1.05%. 
Thus, with regards to standard PageRank, spammers loose -84.3%, and marketers -68.2%.  
One of the consequences of applying paradoxical discounting to PageRank is that many users reach a PageRank 
which is virtually zero and, hence, all of those users tie for the last position (see Table 10). 40.2% of the 
spammers end up in that bin while the rest of them appear among the 30% top ranked users. With regards to 
aggressive marketers, 55% of them reach a negligible PageRank value but the remaining 45% is among the top 
                                                          
 
18
 As it was explained before, TunkRank requires a constant p which is the probability of users retweeting. For 
this experiment we employed a value of 2.87% which was found during the analysis of the dataset (see Table 4). 
As a side note, the value employed by tunkrank.com is 5%. 
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 Let’s compare, for instance, with PageRank which distributes only 1.2% and 2.3% of the available prestige to 
top 10 and top 25 users, respectively. 
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30% users in the graph. Verified accounts behave as expected with 90% of them among the top 14% of users and 
half of them above the 2%. These somewhat mixed results are later discussed. 
5.7. Prestige of abusive users and verified accounts when applying PageRank to a 
“pruned” user graph 
As it was described in a previous section, paradoxical discounting could be used to ―prune‖ the graph which 
would, in turn, be ranked by means of standard PageRank. When applying this approach to the Twitter graph, 
verified accounts grab 10.98% of the available PageRank, spammers 1.84%, and aggressive marketers account 
for 4.27%. Regarding of their positioning (see Table 11), 90% of verified accounts are close to the top 15% of 
users, and half of them are above the top 2%. With regards to abusive users, 90% of the spammers are best 
positioned than half of the users, and half of them are among the top 10% users; aggressive marketers, 90% of 
them appear among the 70% best positioned users, and half of them are among the top 20% users. These results 
will be later discussed because of their implications regarding reciprocal linking in Twitter. 
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Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 165,301 85,645.5 82,651 1 187.5 178 17,940.5 9,686.5 9,619 40,265 20,668.7 20,661.5 
8th 330,606.5 165,308.5 165,301 422 1,115.4 1,069 32,562 17,148 17,940.5 86,683 41,880.3 40,267.5 
7th 495,985.5 247,962.5 330,606.5 1,989 3,325 3,292 54,935 25,679.8 24,227.5 146,608 66,403.4 62,855 
6th 661,268 330,616.5 330,606.5 4,846 6,936.5 6,945 81,251 36,148.6 32,562 221,907 95,327.3 86,683 
5th 826,734.5 413,270.5 413,256.5 9,351 12,723.5 12,438 117,859 48,788.8 42,085.5 318,219 129,933.9 115,519 
4th 992,189 495,924 495,985.5 16,956 23,562.6 23,000 176,590 69,949.4 54,935 446,082 171,494.7 146,608 
3rd 1,156,984 578,578.1 578,550.5 31,638 41,834.2 41,204 282,436.5 87,641.5 66,906 612,565 222,296.9 180,888.5 
2nd 1,323,166 661,232 661,268 54,562 73,861.5 73,066 458,004 121,866.6 81,251 846,257 284,973.9 221,907 
1st 1,487,118.5 743,886.1 743,738.5 97,461 130,283.4 130,608 846,790.5 178,970.1 98,665.5 1,175,085.5 364,625.6 267,299.5 
Table 5. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using standard PageRank to rank the Twitter user graph. 
Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 165,303 82,654.5 82,656.5 13 5,737 5,401 4,032 2,155.7 2,215 14,107 6,602.6 6,330 
8th 330,598 165,308.5 165,303 14,584 35,797.8 36,430 9,121 4,243.3 4,032 35,548 15,271 14,126 
7th 496,058 247,962.5 247,978.5 54,186 71,102.1 71,630 16,608.5 6,986.2 6,131 66,727 26,847.7 23,713 
6th 661,302.5 330,616.6 330,598 87,671 104,383.3 104,069 27,873 10,599.9 9,121 109,830.5 42,021 35,548 
5th 826,483 413,270.7 413,221 121,819 140,075.5 138,731 45,216 15,626.5 12,360 170,056.5 61,174.6 49,404 
4th 990,992 495,924.2 496,058 159,859 181,858.8 181,941 77,618.5 22,933.7 16,608.5 248,962 85,539.6 66,727 
3rd 1,156,625 578,579.5 578,467.5 206,551 235,986.8 236,208 132,640.5 34,292.9 21,127 373,174 116,890.2 87,372 
2nd 1,320,297 661,235.9 661,302.5 269,506 310,013 308,410 252,771.5 53,755.8 27,873 574,641 160,334.7 109,830.5 
1st 1,490,091 743,952.4 742,973.5 361,512 433,174.1 434,604 518,039.5 88,726.6 35,092.5 915,979.5 223,959.3 136,489 
Table 6. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using HITS to rank the Twitter user graph. 
Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 165,307.5 82,654.5 82,654.5 1 187 174 16,214 8,724.1 8,917 37,274.5 19,002 18,822 
8th 330,602.5 165,308.5 165,307.5 433 1,213.8 1,151 30,166 15,615.7 16,214 81,564 39,015.7 37,294 
7th 495,905 247,962.5 247,953.5 2,238 3,654.9 3,603 51,140.5 23,685.4 22,262 139,706 62,453.7 58,977 
6th 661,365 330,616.5 330,602.5 5,322 7,712.3 7,611 75,816.5 33,459.1 30,166 212,520.5 90,346.8 81,564 
5th 826,287 413,270.5 413,309.5 10,493 14,611.2 14,502 111,405 45,443.1 39,187 306,308.5 123,786.1 108,975 
4th 992,190 495,924 495,905 19,453 27,196.2 26,826 168,385 60,910.7 51,140.5 429,445.5 163,948.5 139,706 
3rd 1,175,410.5 578,578.1 578,615.5 35,956 48,267.2 48,183 276,355.5 83,027.3 62,142 585,996 212,707 172,703.5 
2nd 1,322,298 661,232.2 661,365 62,444 83,683.9 82,489 448,658.5 116,781.9 75,816.5 808,880 272,550.8 212,520.5 
1st 1,487,014.5 743,886.2 743,947 109,264 144,141.3 142,370 834,146 172,969.8 93,348.5 1,136,582 349,228.7 256,175.5 
Table 7. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using NodeRanking to rank the Twitter user graph. 
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Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 165,313.5 82,654.5 82,651.5 1 168.4 165 29,875 15,806 15,428 70,623.5 36,099.8 36,341.5 
8th 330,583.5 165,308.5 165,313.5 356 889.8 879 68,423.5 32,130.3 29,875 155,965.5 73,447 70,667.5 
7th 495,982.5 247,962.5 247,988 1,513 2,367.6 2,365 114,073 51,371.2 48,712.5 270,273 118,997.9 110,180.5 
6th 661,167.5 330,616.5 330,583.5 3,329 4,512.6 4,474 187,660 75,544 68,423.5 401,255 173,802 155,965.5 
5th 826,476.5 413,270.5 413,311 5,846 7,687.2 7,657 297,690.5 108,306.6 89,344.5 544,777 233,042.9 208,035.5 
4th 991,747.5 495,924 495,982.5 9,898 12,701.5 12,464 402,848.5 147,929.6 114,073 716,496 298,732.6 270,273 
3rd 1,157,027.5 578,578 578,592.5 16,479 21,506.1 21,331 572,314 195,811.7 146,916.5 901,781.5 371,047.8 337,262 
2nd 1,322,839 661,232.2 661,167.5 27,711 37,395.6 36,531 787,330.5 256,066.8 187,660 1,105,147 449,876.8 401,255 
1st 1,487,335 743,886.1 743,963 51,026 77,552.1 74,914 1,096,915 330,910.7 237,916.5 1,332,358 535,239.9 467,271.5 
Table 8. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using TunkRank to rank the Twitter user graph. 
Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 130,344.5 83,297.9 76,499.5 58 1,148.7 1,028 24,019.5 12,713.8 12,471 130,344.5 53,960.5 52,065.5 
8th 334,540.5 207,115.7 130,344.5 2,796 11,377 10,648 52,065.5 24,371.1 24,019.5 334,540.5 146,980.8 130,344.5 
7th 334,540.5 249,590.7 334,540.5 22,411 40,942.5 39,699 76,499.5 37,128.1 38,463.5 334,540.5 209,491.2 334,540.5 
6th 1,076,966 450,901.4 334,540.5 64,618 95,312.8 95,597 130,344.5 50,195.6 52,065.5 1,076,966 287,363.9 334,540.5 
5th 1,076,966 576,114.3 334,540.5 131,440 172,739.2 170,968 130,344.5 66,239.5 52,065.5 1,076,966 445,255.4 334,540.5 
4th 1,076,966 659,589.2 334,540.5 220,912 276,859.1 274,768 130,344.5 76,911.9 76,499.5 1,076,966 550,524.5 334,540.5 
3rd 1,076,966 719,214.5 1,076,966 341,882 407,691.9 409,117 334,540.5 113,043.3 76,499.5 1,076,966 625,750 334,540.5 
2nd 1,076,966 763,933.5 1,076,966 492,637 575,699.9 566,181 334,540.5 140,699.9 130,344.5 1,076,966 682,142.4 1,076,966 
1st 1,076,966 798,714.9 1,076,966 653,951 785,413.7 750,574 334,540.5 162,258.9 130,344.5 1,076,966 726,022.8 1,076,966 
Table 9. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using TwitterRank to rank the Twitter user graph. 
Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 134,298 83,292.2 85,303 5 343.4 346 49,793 26,242.4 25,470 85,303 48,189 49,793 
8th 312,904.5 196,352.9 134,298 643 1,482.5 1,431 134,298 52,009.5 49,793 312,904.5 92,727.9 85,303 
7th 1,055,174.5 293,060 312,904.5 2,457 3,699.8 3,656 134,298 79,459,2 85,303 312,904.5 166,108.9 134,298 
6th 1,055,174.5 483,588.6 312,904.5 5,077 6,770 6,606 312,904.5 136,279.2 134,298 312,904.5 202,816.2 312,904.5 
5th 1,055,174.5 597,905.8 312,904.5 8,806 11,429.1 11,403 312,904.5 171,635.4 134,298 1,055,174.5 298,771.7 312,904.5 
4th 1,055,174.5 674,116.8 1,055,174.5 14,320 18,252.7 18,239 1,055,174.5 197,063.9 134,298 1,055,174.5 424,819.6 312,904.5 
3rd 1,055,174.5 728,553.7 1,055,174.5 23,048 29,889.2 29,454 1,055,174.5 319,766.9 312,904.5 1,055,174.5 514,893.8 312,904.5 
2nd 1,055,174.5 171,635.4 1,055,174.5 38,618 51,745.5 50,453 1,055,174.5 411,591.5 312,904.5 1,055,174.5 582,417.3 312,904.5 
1st 1,055,174.5 197,063.9 1,055,174.5 69,525 100,689.4 97,890 1,055,174.5 483,170.8 312,904.5 1,055,174.5 634,959.2 312,904.5 
Table 10. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using PageRank with paradoxical de-weighting to rank the Twitter user graph. 
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Decile 
All users Verified accounts Spammers Aggressive marketers 
Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median Min. Avg. Median 
9th 165,313.5 82,654.5 82,653.5 1 203.4 186 14,720 7,856.4 8,083 34,783 17,640.9 17,405.5 
8th 330,623 165,308.5 165,313.5 480 1,341.4 1,244 27,032.5 14,024.2 14,720 76,738.5 36,527.7 34,790.5 
7th 495,918.5 247,962.5 247,965 2,484 4,029.7 3,896 46,741 21,430.7 19,863.5 133,149 58,984.4 55,293.5 
6th 661,199 330,616.5 330,623 5,903 8,493.6 8,304 69,424.5 30,400.2 27,032.5 203,123.5 85,750.6 76,738.5 
5th 826,346 413,270.5 413,236.5 11,624 16,203.7 16,167 102,791.5 41,513.2 35,646 294,846 117,985.8 103,986.5 
4th 991,809.5 495,924.1 495,918.5 21,604 29,449.8 28,972 155,756 55,942.5 46,741 412,074.5 156,724.4 133,149 
3rd 1,156,691 578,578.1 578,616.5 38,474 51,076.5 50,115 251,543 76,324.3 56,803.5 564,040 203,651.2 165,030 
2nd 1,322,537 661,232.3 661,199 66,758 87,946.3 88,293 416,371 107,509.6 69,424.5 775,863 261,087.1 203,123.5 
1st 1,486,604.5 743,886 743,962.5 112,303 146,162.1 144,613 757,974 159,341.3 85,980 1,097,854.5 334,896.5 244,943.5 
Table 11. Minimum, average, and median position for Twitter users, verified accounts, spammers, and marketers,  
across different deciles when using PageRank to rank a Twitter user graph ―pruned‖ by means of paradoxical de-weighting. 
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Figure 3. Percent of verified accounts found for different slices of the users ranking. 
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Figure 4. Details showing the differences among the best performing algorithms  
when ranking verified accounts. 
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Figure 5. Percent of spammers found for different slices of the users ranking. 
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Figure 6. Percent of aggressive marketers found for different slices of the users ranking. 
5.8. Agreement between the different rankings 
Up to now we have shown the ability of the different algorithms to ―penalize‖ abusive users while still ranking 
atop relevant users (i.e. verified accounts). In addition to that, it would be interesting to check if the induced 
rankings are ―plausible‖ and the level of agreement between them. Table 12 shows the top 30 users according to 
the different ranking algorithms.  
As it can be seen, PageRank, NodeRanking, TunkRank and ―pruned‖ PageRank exhibit a large level of 
agreement; all of them highly rank celebrities and personalities, news wires, and a few companies. ―Discounted‖ 
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PageRank, promotes several new users to the top rank, most of them musicians or related to alternative news 
wires. All of those algorithms spotted plenty of verified accounts among the top 30 users. 
HITS and TwitterRank are another question. HITS top rank is plagued with self-proclaimed entrepreneurs, CEOs, 
marketers and gurus. TwitterRank, probably because of the importance of content similarity between different 
users, promotes to the top of the list mainly feeds and robots interwoven in tight networks. The presence of 
verified accounts in both top 30 user lists is virtually null. 
Table 12, however, just provides anecdotal evidence. In order to gain details on the behavior of the different 
ranking algorithms we compared them by means of the normalized version of Kendall distance with a zero 
penalty parameter ([38] and [14], respectively). Figures 7 to 9 show the agreement between the different 
rankings and PageRank, TunkRank, and ―discounted‖ PageRank. In the following section we will discuss the 
implications of such results. 
PageRank NodeRanking 
"Pruned" 
PageRank 
TunkRank 
"Discounted" 
PageRank 
HITS TwitterRank 
* aplusk (actor) * aplusk (actor) 
* cnnbrk 
(news) 
* aplusk (actor) 
ryanada_ms 
(musician) 
radioblogger 
iphone_app_sale 
(feed) 
* cnnbrk (news) 
* cnnbrk 
(news) 
* aplusk (actor) 
* cnnbrk 
(news) 
aesthetictheory 
(web designer) 
brooksbayne 
(entrepreneur) 
iphone_app_mk
up (feed) 
johncmayer 
(musician) 
johncmayer 
(musician) 
johncmayer 
(musician) 
* stephenfry 
(actor) 
* 
themandymoore 
(musician) 
stephenkruiser 
socialpsych 
(feed) 
* stephenfry 
(actor) 
* stephenfry 
(actor) 
* stephenfry 
(actor) 
johncmayer 
(musician) 
astro_127 
(astronaut) 
twitter_tips 
psychnews 
(feed) 
* iamdiddy 
(musician) 
* iamdiddy 
(musician) 
* iamdiddy 
(musician) 
* theonion 
(news satire) 
* 
barbarajwalters 
(news) 
bigrichb Clareelaine 
* jimmyfallon 
(comedian) 
* theonion 
(news satire) 
* theonion 
(news satire) 
* jimmyfallon 
(comedian) 
jaygordonmdfaa
p (doctor) 
wbaustin 
(marketer) 
iss_safeguard 
(feed) 
* theonion 
(news satire) 
* jimmyfallon 
(comedian) 
* jimmyfallon 
(comedian) 
* ryanseacrest 
(radio star) 
* aplusk (actor) astronautics 
issmontserrat 
(feed) 
* ryanseacrest 
(radio star) 
* ryanseacrest 
(radio star) 
* nytimes 
(news) 
* iamdiddy 
(musician) 
* stephenfry 
(actor) 
mattbacak 
(marketer) 
Allenwilk 
* nytimes 
(news) 
* mashable 
(news) 
* mashable 
(news) 
* katyperry 
(musician) 
fmlteam (blog) praguebob Driveorfly 
* mrskutcher 
(actress) 
* nytimes 
(news) 
* ryanseacrest 
(radio star) 
* mrskutcher 
(actress) 
* cnnbrk 
(news) 
ann_sieg 
(marketer) 
tyneweather 
(robot) 
* mashable 
(news) 
* 
sarahksilverma
n (comedian) 
* 
sarahksilverma
n (comedian) 
* rustyrockets 
(comedian) 
* breakingnews 
(news) 
jeanettejoy 
teesweather 
(robot) 
* 
sarahksilverman 
(comedian) 
* mrskutcher 
(actress) 
* mrskutcher 
(actress) 
* coldplay 
(musician) 
johncmayer 
(musician) 
tmaduri 
nyc_tweets 
(robot) 
* rustyrockets 
(comedian) 
* rustyrockets 
(comedian) 
* breakingnews 
(news) 
* petewentz 
(musician) 
* nytimes 
(news) 
* joelcomm 
phoenix_tweets 
(robot) 
* petewentz 
(musician) 
* techcrunch 
(news) 
* techcrunch 
(news) 
* nytimes 
(news) 
* 
jimmyeatworld 
(musician) 
oliver_turner o2apps (feed) 
* katyperry 
(musician) 
* petewentz 
(musician) 
* rustyrockets 
(comedian) 
nprpolitics 
(news) 
webware (news) andrew303 
apolloapps 
(feed) 
* breakingnews 
(news) 
* robcorddry 
(actor) 
* pennjillette 
(magician) 
* danecook 
(comedian) 
crave (news) 
startuppro 
(entrepreneur) 
chicago_tweets 
(suspended) 
* techcrunch 
(news) 
* snoopdogg 
(musician) 
* robcorddry 
(actor) 
* postsecret (art 
project) 
* google 
(company) 
alohaarleen 
rm_extreme 
(robot) 
* pennjillette 
(magician) 
* hodgman 
(actor) 
* timoreilly 
(founder of 
O'Reilly 
Media) 
* robdyrdek 
(celebrity) 
imeem (music) 
orrin_woodward 
(guru) 
thouoaksweather 
(robot) 
* robcorddry 
(actor) 
* ev (CEO of 
Twitter) 
* ev (CEO of 
Twitter) 
* google 
(company) 
* soundcloud 
(music) 
upicks 
(marketer) 
sb_weather 
(robot) 
nprpolitics 
(news) 
nprpolitics 
(news) 
astro_127 
(astronaut) 
* pennjillette 
(magician) 
* mpoppel 
(founder of 
BNO news) 
alicam (guru) rm_jam (robot) 
* snoopdogg 
(musician) 
* breakingnews 
(news) 
* hodgman 
(actor) 
* starbucks 
(company) 
Alboebno (BNO 
news journalist) 
oudiantebi 
(CEO) 
isk_g1_1 
* hodgman 
(actor) 
* katyperry 
(musician) 
nprpolitics 
(news) 
* chelsealately 
(show) 
felix85 (BNO 
news 
contributor) 
scotmckay 
(coach) 
sf_tweets 
(robot) 
* alyankovic 
(musician) 
* alyankovic 
(musician) 
* petewentz 
(musician) 
* joelmchale 
(comedian) 
Joebrooks clatko andyfranks1 
* ev (CEO of 
Twitter) 
* mchammer 
(musician) 
* snoopdogg 
(musician) 
* mashable 
(news) 
* astro_mike 
(astronaut) 
brat13 triciabothwell 
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* mchammer 
(musician) 
* 
michaelianblac
k (comedian) 
* katyperry 
(musician) 
* alyankovic 
(musician) 
jeffbarr 
(Amazon 
evangelist) 
robmcnealy 
(marketer) 
rm_club (robot) 
* 
michaelianblack 
(comedian) 
* timoreilly 
(founder of 
O'Reilly 
Media) 
* mchammer 
(musician) 
ichcheezburger 
(humor) 
* 
hollymadison12
3 (model) 
0boy 
rm_harder 
(robot) 
* jon_favreau 
(actor) 
* pennjillette 
(magician) 
* alyankovic 
(musician) 
alancarr 
(comedian) 
sonsofnero 
(designer) 
seanmalarkey 
(entrepreneur) 
isk_g1_10 
(robot) 
* joelmchale 
(comedian) 
* jon_favreau 
(actor) 
* jon_favreau 
(actor) 
* jason_mraz 
(musician) 
* twitterapi 
(Twitter API) 
suburbview 
isk_g1_17 
(robot) 
* starbucks 
(company) 
* starbucks 
(company) 
* jack (Co-
founder of 
Twitter) 
* marthastewart 
(entrepreneur) 
warped09 
(music festival) 
coolsi 
(marketer) 
isk_g1_18 
(robot) 
* timoreilly 
(founder of 
O'Reilly Media) 
* google 
(company) 
* starbucks 
(company) 
* markhoppus 
(musician) 
katehavnevik 
(musician) 
caseywright 
(CEO) 
isk_g1_16 
(robot) 
Table 12. Top-30 users according to different ranking algorithms ordered from left to right in descending order 
of number of verified accounts atop (marked with an asterisk). A brief description is provided with the user alias. 
Those users shown in bold appear in the PageRank list. Those shaded appear at least in another list. 
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Figure 7. Aggrement between PageRank and the rest of rankings. 
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Figure 8. Agreement between TunkRank and the rest of rankings. 
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Figure 9. Agreement between PageRank with paradoxical discounting and the rest of rankings. 
6. Discussion of results 
As we have explained before, our approach to evaluate the available ranking algorithms in the context of social 
networks was not based on an a priori ―good‖ ranking but, instead, their capacity of ranking relevant users (i.e. 
verified accounts) atop as a whole group while, at the same time, being robust to ―gaming‖ by abusive users, i.e. 
their ―ability‖ to penalize spammers and aggressive marketers who try to reach better positions by exchanging 
links instead of providing better content. 
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Because of the common knowledge about PageRank and, additionally, the fact that it seems to be applied by 
Google to rank Twitter users in their real-time web search engine, we decided to take that method as the baseline 
against which the rest of techniques should be compared.  
The analysis of the results obtained by PageRank when applied to the Twitter user graph support our initial 
concern, that is, one user’s PageRank is not only a measure of his value within the Twitter ecosystem, but also a 
consequence of the ―tips and tricks‖ one can employ when establishing relationships within the social network. 
This is the only plausible explanation for spammers being much better positioned than aggressive marketers 
when the value of the contents they provide is virtually negligible. 
There are two methods which are extremely similar to PageRank in terms of ranking abusive and relevant users, 
and in terms of ranking aggrement: NodeRanking and ―pruned‖ PageRank. With respect to NodeRanking, the 
similarities are unsurprising given that both NR and PR are highly related. Perhaps NodeRanking could reach its 
full potential with a weighted Twitter graph; however, the way in which such a weighted graph could be inferred 
from Twitter data (e.g. taking into account the number of mentions or retweets among users, or their content 
similarity) is out of the scope of this paper. In this regard, however, we must note that both methods slightly 
underperform PageRank: on one hand, they promote to top positions a slightly lesser number of verified 
accounts than PageRank and, on conversely, they promote a slightly larger number of abusive users than 
PageRank. 
The similarity between the results obtained by PageRank and PageRank applied to the ―pruned‖ Twitter graph 
are somewhat expected; however, they deserve a deeper analysis because they support of the points of this 
author. Let us remember that the ―pruned‖ graph was obtained by removing those users (and their in- and out-
links) with zero de-weighting which, in turn, was computed taking into account reciprocal links between users. 
One of the arguments of this author is that discounting reciprocal links is a pretty fine way to separate users 
contributing to the ecosystem, from those with little or no value at all. The results obtained with the total Twitter 
graph and the ―pruned‖ graph are virtually the same and, thus, we can take that as supportive of the fact that 
most reciprocal links are not legitimate but, instead, merely an aim to reach larger audiences. 
In contrast, there are two methods which greatly differ not only from PageRank but also from the other 
techniques, namely HITS and TwitterRank. Each of them exhibits different problems when applied to the Twitter 
graph.  
HITS underperforms PageRank with respect to both verified accounts and abusive users. As it can be seen in 
Table 12 the top list produced by HITS is plagued by mostly irrelevant users (at least compared with the top lists 
produced by the other methods) which can be also appreciated in Figure 3. Moreover, if we checked the number 
of followers and followees for those users we could see that the ratio for most of them is close to 1 and, in fact, 
most of them have got a large number of reciprocal links.  
In fact, because of the very nature of HITS, this algorithm is virtually inoperative when confronted with a 
relatively small number of users weaving a tight network of reciprocal connections. Let’s remember that many 
spammers and marketers tend to massive follow other users in order to gain a follow-back link. Because of this, 
when computing hub scores those users’ values tend to grow very fast; then, those hub scores are used to 
compute authority scores for their followees (which are mostly spammers and following them back). It is clear 
that after several iterations those users with lots of reciprocal links earn an undeserved amount of authority. 
Hence, the HITS algorithm is not advisable at all to rank users within social networks since it is clear that HITS 
is not robust to follow-spam. 
The results achieved by TwitterRank were very disappointing. Conceptually, it is a very appealing method: it 
provides ways to incorporate both content similarity measures and transition probabilities into the ranking. Some 
way, however, these appealing ideas seem to fail: as it can be seen from the top list, most of the users are feeds 
and robots, many of them highly related (even with strikingly similar names). To be fair it must be said that 
modifying a topic-sensitive method to operate globally is, perhaps, pushing too hard the technique. However, 
given that even the simplified version implemented for this research (using cosine similarity instead of LSA) is 
(1) much more computationally expensive than the rest of methods surveyed, and (2) it requires much more data 
(namely, the tweets) to obtain the rankings, it seems not at all recommendable, especially when other available 
methods (e.g. TunkRank) are faster and provide much better results (at least when applied globally to the 
complete user graph). 
Lastly, there are one method clearly outperforming PageRank with respect to both ranking atop verified accounts 
and penalizing abusive users: TunkRank. It is certainly similar to PageRank but it makes a much better job 
spotting relevant users and also when confronted with ―cheating‖: aggressive marketers are almost 
indistinguishable from common users –which is, of course, desirable; and spammers just manage to grab a much 
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smaller amount of the global available prestige and reach lower positions –although they still manage to be better 
positioned than average users. In addition to that, the ranking induced by TunkRank certainly agrees with that of 
PageRank, especially at the very top of the list, and, moreover, it is able to put a larger number of verified 
accounts at top ranks. Thus, TunkRank is a highly recommendable ranking method to apply to social networks: it 
is simple, it prominently ranks relevant users, and severely penalizes spammers when compared to PageRank. 
With regards to the variation to PageRank described by this author, ―discounted‖ PageRank, the results are not 
highly conclusive.  
On one hand, performance against the proposed benchmarks is pretty good. With regards to demoting abusive 
users, it seems to outperform PageRank –and even TunkRank– because the amount of prestige grabbed by such 
users is smaller and their rankings lower than when applying standard PageRank. With regards to spotting 
verified accounts, as it is shown in Figure 4, it outperforms PageRank (although underperforms TunkRank).  
Nevertheless, it has two issues which deserve further research. On one hand, the induced ranking could be 
labeled as ―elitist‖ because most of the users –about 70%– tie for the last position. Certainly, this is unsurprising 
given that 16% of the users in the graph have got a zero de-weighting factor what we interpret as their 
contributions being ―worthless‖ for the network as a whole. Moreover, such results are consistent with the well-
known participation inequality [41], and with a recent study revealing that 75% of the users just publish a tweet 
every 9 days, and 25% of the users do not tweet at all [25]. Hence, this could be considered a minor issue. 
On another hand, ―discounted‖ PageRank exhibits a fairly distinctive curve (see Figure 9) when comparing its 
agreement with other rankings –obviating the underperforming HITS and TwitterRank. The agreement is much 
lower than, for instance, that found between PageRank and TunkRank, but the most striking behavior is the local 
maximum at the top positions, followed by a relatively large trough, to eventually stabilize. We found several 
lesser-known users at top ranks and, after studying them, we concluded that most of them have one or more 
―famous‖ followers who, in many cases, they manage to outrank. We have denoted this as the ―giant shoulders‖ 
effect and it explains not only the trough at the head of the list but the smaller agreement for the rest of the 
ranking: many of the top users from PageRank or TunkRank are a little behind of lesser-known users they are 
following. This is aesthetically displeasing, at least, and the effect it can exert in the applications of the ranking 
is still to be explored. Nevertheless, tackling with this and the former issue is left for future research. 
7. Implications, conclusions, and future work 
This study makes four main contributions. First, when applying graph prestige algorithms to social networks, 
ranking is not only a measure of a user’s value but also the result of ―gaming‖ the algorithm by means of 
relationship links. The fact that spammers –who contribute no valuable content– are consistently better 
positioned than marketers –who contribute somewhat valuable information– no matter the method employed 
supports this assert.  
Second, evaluating ranking should not be a point in itself; it should, instead, be evaluated within an objective 
context. To compare the performance of different algorithms two metrics are to be applied: First, relevant users 
should reach top ranks as a whole without regards to their internal ordering. Secondly, abusive users should not 
reach undeserved rankings.  
Third, TunkRank is an obvious candidate to rank users in social networks. Although highly related to PageRank, 
TunkRank outperforms it with respect to both spotting relevant users in top positions, and penalizing abusive 
users. In addition to that, it is simple to implement and computationally cheap –at least as cheap as PageRank. 
And fourth, reciprocal linking in social networks is, in many cases, a sign of follow spam instead of mutual 
interest among legitimate users. This is supported by two experimental findings:  
 First, by applying PageRank to a Twitter graph where users with zero de-weighting were removed we 
achieved virtually the same results than when applying the same algorithm to the whole graph. In other 
words, most of the reciprocal links do not provide any information at all.  
 Second, when incorporating to PageRank a way to de-weight influence on the basis of reciprocal links 
spammers are highly demoted while a higher number of relevant users are found at top positions. In 
other words, although most of the reciprocal links provide little information this is not applicable to all 
of them and, hence, they should not be simply removed but accounted for as shown in Section 3.4. 
This study opens several lines of research. First, the rankings induced by the different methods should be 
analyzed in other contexts, for instance, as a way to rank content providers in order to find relevant information 
within a social network. Second, TunkRank is not immune to manipulation and, thus, its vulnerabilities should be 
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thoroughly studied (e.g. Sybil attacks could be a starting point). And third, a deeper analysis of the role of 
nepotistic links, in general, and the ―discounted ratio‖ described in this paper, in particular, is needed. 
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Appendix. In-depth Analysis of the Twitter Dataset 
The study described in this paper relied on a Twitter dataset collected by the author along 2009. The dataset is 
composed of two different parts: a collection of 27.9 million English tweets, and a user graph comprising 1.8 
million users and 134 million connections. In this Appendix we provide an in-depth analysis of such dataset: we 
describe both the network characteristics and several demographical features of the users in the network. 
Table A-1 shows some statistics describing the collected graph and compares it with the graph previously built 
by Java et al. [29], and with the whole Twitter crawl by Kwak et al. [31]. Some of the values for those graphs are 
fairly similar –or at least comparable– while those with bigger differences can be attributed, in all probability, to 
the Twitter growth in the last two years, in addition to sampling artifacts. In fact, when comparing the graphs by 
this author and Java et al., the increase in the average degree, the size of both the largest WCC and SCC, and the 
clustering coefficient is consistent with a growth in the number of users together with a larger number of 
connections between them. 
Property Twitter sample (2009) Twitter graph (2009) [31] Twitter in 2007 [29] 
Total nodes 1,804,131 41.7M 87,897 
Total links 134,500,669 1,047M 829,247 
Average Degree 74.55 25.11 18.86 
Indegree Slope -1.33 -2.276 -2.4 
Outdegree Slope -1.516 N/A -2.4 
Degree Correlation 0.490 N/A 0.59 
Diameter 6 4.8 (effective diameter [50]) 6 
Largest WCC size 1,800,132 (99.78%) N/A 81,769 (93.03%) 
Largest SCC size 1,688,395 (93.58%) N/A 42,900 (48.81%) 
Clustering coefficient 0.151 N/A 0.106 
Reciprocity 0.48 N/A 0.58 
Table A-1. Network properties for three different Twitter graph crawls. From left to right, the graph collected by 
this author, a whole complete graph crawled in 2009 [31], and a subgraph collected in 2007 [29]. 
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Figure A-1. Outdegree and indegree distributions in the Twitter graph. Both exhibit a power law exponent  
(-1.516 for the outdegree and -1.33 for the indegree). Surprisingly, Kwak et al. argue that the follower 
distribution for the whole Twitter graph does not follow a power law [31]. 
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Figure A-2. Scatter plot showing the correlation between in- and out-links in the Twitter user graph. The 0.49 
correlation is similar, although somewhat smaller than the reported in [29]. 
During the graph collection profile information was obtained for each user, namely the user’s name, location, 
biography and website (see Table A-2 for an extract of such profiles). Such information was employed to 
determine the geographical location, gender, and age of the users.  
It must be noted that locations are nothing but free text and, thus, it’s up to the user providing a sensible location 
(e.g. London or NYC) or something mostly irrelevant (e.g. at home or in the office). We processed the available 
locations (62.31% of the users provide such a string) and tried to match them to geographic coordinates by 
means of a geocoding service
20
. Eventually, 50.36% of the original profiles provided a location string suitable to 
be matched to actual coordinates.  
Given the noisiness of locations, one could argue that some, even many, of the obtained coordinates could be 
wrong. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the map in Figure A-3 most of the locations must be necessarily correct: 
users from English speaking countries are majority (the USA and the British Isles are specially prominent); 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Netherlands, central Europe and Israel have also a major 
presence in the sample. Finally, there exist pockets of English-tweeting users in virtually every country but 
concentrated, as expected, in major global cities (e.g. Paris, Tokyo, Madrid, Seoul, Buenos Aires or São Paulo). 
On the other hand, the distribution within English speaking countries faithfully corresponds with their population 
density. So, in short, it seems safe to claim that half of Twitter users provide an accurate geographical location. 
The name and biography fields were in turn employed to infer some demographic features about the sampled 
users, namely gender and age. To determine the gender we parted from the “Frequently Occurring First Names 
and Surnames From the 1990 Census”21; those data files provide 88,799 surnames, 4,275 female first names and 
1,219 male first names. We assumed that any user name starting with a first name and ending with a last name 
from the census was a valid personal name. Certainly, many people provide aliases, just their first name, or their 
names and/or surnames are not frequent enough to appear in the U.S. Census data; however, we think that this 
approach is the best for the sake of higher precision.  
With regards to those first names appearing in both male and female data files (e.g. Alexis, Charlie, or 
Dominique) we assign gender according to the frequency of appearance provided the difference was high 
enough. In this regards, Alexis and Dominique were always considered female names while Charlie was 
                                                          
 
20
 http://developer.yahoo.com/maps/rest/V1/geocode.html 
21
 http://www.census.gov/genealogy/names/ 
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considered a male name. Of course, this is an oversimplification which, certainly, could be improved by taking 
into account the data in the biography field but we considered that, for the descriptive purposes of this section, it 
is good enough.  
To support that claim some anecdotal evidence can be provided. First, there exists an almost perfect positive 
correlation between the last name distribution in the U.S. 1990 Census and within the Twitter users (0.9701). 
The correlation regarding first name lists is smaller but still positive (0.6355 for female names and 0.6356 for 
male names). Arguably, this can be due to a major presence of young users among twitterers. As it can be seen 
in Table A-3 just one female name appear in both top-10 lists (Jennifer) while three are common for male names 
(James, John and Michael). Both situations seem consistent with the fact that given names have relatively fast 
turnovers (well under a decade), in particular, female names (cf. [35]). 
In addition to this, we computed the most distinctive terms in both male and female biographies by means of a 
likelihood-ratio test in a way analog to that of [29]. Among the top-10 words for females were mom, girl, wife 
and mother, while husband, guy, father, dad and man appeared at the top of the list for male users; Table A-4 
provides a more exhaustive list. 
Hence, it seems that our method to assign gender to Twitter users is reasonably accurate and, thus, it can help to 
provide a picture of the demographics of these users. About 650,000 users provide a personal name (both first 
and last name appearing the 1990 Census data files), accounting for 36.46% of the users in the graph, from 
which 58.61% were men and 41.39% women. 
Bambaloo Emma Bullen London   
becky_mallery becky mallery Kent (but second home 
london!) 
MSc Positive 
Psychology Student, 
Author and Coach 
 
Burkjackson burkjackson iPhone: 46.181351,-
123.818344 
creative, thinker, 
father, dreamer... 
http://www.Jackson5Home.com/ 
natekoechley Nate Koechley Home I split time between 
online & San 
Francisco. One wife, 
one daughter, two cats, 
three vices & four 
eyes. Now: Outspark's 
VP of UX. Previously 
Yahoo! & YUI. 
http://nate.koechley.com/blog 
pete_watson pete_watson England - home of the 
uprising 
  
scottisafool Scott Lovegrove 50.69052061,-1.93774726 Software tester for a 
telecomms company in 
South England 
http://scottisafool.spaces.live.com/ 
ShaLaylaj ShaLayla J. Simmons Too far from home I've actually been 
hailed as probably the 
most significant 
woman who's ever 
existed (I was hoping 
for Jet Beauty of the 
Week, but I can make 
this work). 
 
Swpatrick Patrick Littlemore London, South & West London Career Estate 
Agent (Lettings). 
Married and father of 
one amazing angel. An 
Australian who loves 
London! 
http://tiny.cc/Tenants 
TheRealSani Sandra S. Home, sweet home Hi, I'm Sani and i 
believe in GOD. I love 
peace, butterflys, 
Retro, Mick Jagger and 
how my life's going... 
 
ZimHilton Hilton Barbour Misty London UK Networker. Loves 
travelling - love my 2 
daughters more. 
Perpetually curious. 
http://hiltonbarbour.com 
Table A-2. An extract of the user profiles contained in the dataset. As it can be seen these profiles comprised the 
screen name, the user name, location, short biography and website. All of the fields, except for the first two, are 
optional. 
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Figure A-3. Map showing the global distribution of users in the dataset. Let’s remember that it only contains 
tweets written in English and, thus, English-speaking countries should concentrate most of the users. 
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Smith 
Johnson 
Jones 
Brown 
Williams 
Miller 
Davis 
Lee 
Wilson 
Taylor 
Sarah 
Jennifer 
Amanda 
Michelle 
Amy 
Stephanie 
Rachel 
Heather 
Katie 
Jessica 
Chris 
Michael 
John 
James 
Mark 
Matt 
David 
Mike 
Paul 
Andrew 
Smith 
Johnson 
Williams 
Jones 
Brown 
Davis 
Miller 
Wilson 
Moore 
Taylor 
Mary 
Patricia 
Linda 
Barbara 
Elizabeth 
Jennifer 
Maria 
Susan 
Margaret 
Dorothy 
James 
John 
Robert 
Michael 
William 
David 
Richard 
Charles 
Joseph 
Thomas 
Table A-3. List showing the top-10 first and last names in both Twitter and the U.S. 1990 Census.  
Names appearing in both lists are shown in bold. 
Top 50 terms appearing in female biographies Top 50 terms appearing in male biographies 
love 
life 
mom 
girl 
wife 
mother 
friends 
lover 
loves 
fun 
live 
family 
crazy 
loving 
laugh 
fashion 
daughter 
happy 
friend 
music 
world 
woman 
mum 
married 
mommy  
sister 
person 
dance 
heart 
home 
little 
want 
know 
reading 
people 
art 
beautiful 
boys 
single 
amazing 
wife mother 
actress 
kids 
books 
hi 
love music 
lol 
dog 
chick 
teacher 
husband 
guy 
web 
father 
developer 
geek 
dad 
man 
designer 
musician 
sports 
technology 
tech 
director 
software 
entrepreneur 
engineer 
media 
producer 
internet 
marketing 
photographer 
fan 
husband father 
pastor  
video 
gamer 
computer 
business 
founder 
consultant 
design 
player 
games 
radio 
manager 
church 
digital 
actor 
programmer 
web developer 
guitar 
ceo 
enthusiast 
dude 
play 
dj 
online 
beer 
development 
Table A-4. Top 50 more distinctive terms for female (on the left) and male (on the right) users in Twitter. Those 
terms which have a clear associated gender are shown in bold. The rest of terms do not have any prior gender but 
some patterns arise: female users tend to describe their family life, while male users tend to describe their 
occupations. 
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Figure A-4. Age distribution of Twitter users. 
In addition to gender, we also tried to determine the age of the users. To that end we relied on the biographies 
appearing in the profiles, and employed simple patterns (i.e. looking for “years old” or “year-old” preceded by 
a number or a numeral). This is also a crude approach, and prone to some mistakes (consider for instance the 
phrase “proud mother of 6 years old boy”) but, all in all, we consider the results highly plausible. Only 10,915 
users provide an identifiable ―age‖ in their biographies, the average is 21.67 years with standard deviation of 
11.086 years. The distribution is clearly not normal, and users between 15 and 29 years account for 70% of the 
population. Such a bias toward young adults is, however, expected given the social nature of Twitter, and 
consistent with the previous discussion about first names. 
As we did with male vs. female users, we also obtained distinctive terms from the users’ biographies within each 
age range. Such terms do provide some clues on the confidence one can place on the aforementioned method to 
determine the age of Twitter users. Table A-5 shows how the most distinctive terms almost perfectly fit the usual 
age stereotypes in the U.S. and the UK. For instance, 10 to 14 year-old users are fans of Twilight, Jonas Brothers 
and Miley Cyrus while users from 15 to 24 years tend to mention school, college and university. Users from 25 
to 59 years are commonly married, with kids being especially prominent from 30 onwards. Grandparenthood 
appears as early as 45-49 years, but is much more common from 55 onwards. Lastly, from 60 to 74 years old, 
retirement does appear. 
Needless to say, there are mistakes: as it was expected, users from 0 to 9 years old are not in fact that age but 
parents with little children, instead. With regards to the age range of 85 years and more, it seems that most of the 
users are not indeed that age given the lack of terms appearing in the immediately prior ranges, besides the great 
heterogeneity of the distinctive terms for that age. If those age ranges are dropped, then the average age is 21.13 
years with standard deviation of 9.08 years. 
Finally, by combining age and gender it is possible to produce a population pyramid for Twitter (see Figure A-
5). Only 4,295 users have both gender and age information and, thus, it’s not entirely representative of Twitter 
users as a whole. However, we can extract some knowledge from it: the current prominence of male users 
against female users is expected to gradually change towards parity, even, surpassing the number of male users; 
as it can be seen, female users in the 10-14 and 15-19 ranges (the so-called digital natives) clearly surpass the 
number of male users. 
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0 to 4 years mom, son, daughter, mother, boy, wife, home, stay, little, married, beautiful, father, home mom, twins 
5 to 9 years mom, son, daughter, mother, twins, boy, married, boys, twin, wife, father, dad, home, marketing, husband 
10 to 14 years love, girl, name, twilight, hey, jonas brothers, boy, follow, twitter, miley cyrus, grade, fan, live, demi, hi 
15 to 19 years music, girl, love, friends, name, school, student, hey, follow, hi, know, college, loves, jonas brothers 
20 to 24 years college student, life, university, major, world, studying, design, music, working, fun, graduate, living, trying 
25 to 29 years married, living, work, wife, working, male, geek, mother, guy, kids, writer, teacher, husband, manager 
30 to 34 years married, kids, mother, husband, father, male, lover, single, children, beautiful, work, wife, female, living 
35 to 39 years married, male, boys, children, single, mom, good, father, kids, mother, radio, business, mum, guy 
40 to 44 years married, single, man, kids, father, children, mother, living, woman, wife, mom, wonderful, male, dogs 
45 to 49 years grandmother, boys, wife, married, kids, wonderful boys, children, marketing, father, mother, sons, happily 
50 to 54 years married, woman, adult, male, single, children, people, daughters, man, father, cooking, grandchildren 
55 to 59 years married, cats, children, internet, grandchildren, hanging, ex, man, spiders, surgery, widow, male, gardening 
60 to 64 years retired, grandchildren, south, life, archaeology, flowers, traveller, enjoying, electro, goals, lawyer, physics 
65 to 69 years man, diving, body, time, retired, country, lives, technology, marketing, business, likes, single, school 
70 to 74 years grandfather, blogs, running, retired, tech, computer, blogger, man, female 
75 to 79 years granddaughters, dog, grandchildren, stories, bike, grown, tennis, life, living, almost, children, play 
80 to 84 years help, pension, retire, listener, independent, look, money, others, yeah, company, movies, love 
85 years newspaper, home, cats, care, aquarium, satisfied, port, bones, river, trades, blogs, books, lol, reader, tea 
Table A-5. Distinctive terms from the users’ biographies for each age range. Clearly stereotypical terms are 
shown in bold. 
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Figure A-5. Population pyramid for Twitter built from the biographies of the 4,295 users who provided both age 
and gender information. 
To sum up, our dataset consists of two different collections: a series of tweets, and the network of users who 
published them. The tweets collection comprises 27.9 million English tweets posted between January 26, 2009 
and August 31, 2009. The user graph consists of 1.8 million users with 134 million connections. 50% of the 
users are geolocatable, and most of them reside, as expected, in English speaking countries. It was possible to 
determine gender for one third of the users; of these, 59% were men and 41% women. A relatively small number 
of users provide age information. Taken them as sample, the average age in Twitter is 21 years and users 
between 15 and 29 years account for 70% of the total. By examining both age and gender, it seems that the male 
predominance in Twitter has its days numbered because female surpass male users among the youngsters (10 to 
19 years old). 
